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The purpose of this thesis is to review the Department
of Defense (DOD) and the Army policies regarding graduate
education at civilian institutions. Particular attention is
paid to Congressional, General Accounting Office (GAO)
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS
Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) —The term used for all Army
post-graduate civilian education programs, to include
degree and non-degree producing.
Officer—This term includes both Army commissioned and
warrant officers. Use of the term "officers" within
this thesis refers to commissioned officers only.
Specialties—This term is used generically in reference to
Army officer branches and functional areas.
AERB Obligated Asset—an officer, who upon completion of 2 6
weeks or more of full-time graduate schooling, is
required by DOD policy to serve an initial utilization
tour (36 months) in an AERB validated position.
Long Course—A full-time civilian post-graduate education
program 2 6 weeks or more.
Short Course—Refers to the Army Short Course Program
whereby officers attend short duration civilian courses
which have application to their current assignments.
This program augments the Army Training System.
Army Graduate Education System (AGES) —The author's own
term. AGES is a subset of ACS. AGES refers to the Army
system components associated with graduate degrees,
master's and doctorate levels.
Transit, Holding and Student (THS) Account—The account that
contains all Army personnel not actually occupying a
position in the operational account. The THS includes
those personnel in transit to new assignments, in hospi-
tals and confinement facilities, and attending schools,
military and civilian.
The Army Authorization and Documentation System (TAADS)
—
Commonly referred to as "authorizations." TAADS
includes all duty positions, officers and enlisted.
Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) —Refers to non-
combat units and authorizations within these units.
TDA's are also non standard type units.
Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) —Refers to combat
units and authorizations within these units.
Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) —The direc-
torate within the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center
(MILPERCEN) which operates the Officer Personnel
Management System (OPMS) . OPMS is the system by which
officers are professionally developed, managed,
assigned, utilized and evaluated. Special branches.
Judge Advocate General Corps, Chaplain Corps and Medical
Corps are not managed by OPMD.
Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) —See Officer
Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD)
.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Civil War, Army leadership has recognized that
it cannot educate all its officers or fulfill all service
educational needs via its own military schools. Today, the
Army minimum civilian education goal is that all commission-
ed officers have bachelor's degrees and that 2 percent of
OPMD-managed officers have graduate degrees. Graduate
education is increasingly necessary in today's rapidly
changing and advancing technological environment. The
United States is confronted by the Soviet Union and its
allies that pose a severe threat to the Free World,
politically, economically, and militarily. This threat and
the maintenance of world peace must be met by an American
military capability of at lease equal competence. This
means preparedness—of men, machines and material. The key,
of course, is men—servicemembers ' ability to execute war
successfully through efficient and effective use of war
machines and materials. In order to accomplish this
mission, the force must be well-educated and trained. The
time to educate and train (and equip) is before the advent
of hostilities. The next war will be a "come as you are"
conflict. And the winner (if a winner will exist) will be
the one that has the best prepared military.
The American people have a right to expect and demand
that their sons and daughters will be led by military
leaders who are well-trained, educated and prepared. To
that goal, the U.S. military must direct all its resources.
The U.S. military is a closed operating system. It
cannot "hire" already trained and educated personnel. It
must train and educate its own. And to accomplish this it
must rely on internal training and educating systems—mili-
tary schools, on-the-job training, individual self-develop-
ment, etc.; and civilian educational institutions. The
levels of expertise, functionally and cognitively, needed by
the officers corps to meet modern preparedness demands
cannot be met solely by internal military training and
education systems. Increasingly, the U.S. military must
rely on civilian colleges and universities to meet these
needs.
In recognition of the above, the Army has developed the
Army Graduate Education System (AGES)-'-, the purpose of
which is to identify specific Army requirements and then




From July 1981 to June 1984, this officer served at
United States Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) as
-'-This author's own term. This system is described in
Chapter III.
the co-manager of this system. The duties required the
incumbent to become the Army's spokesman and resident expert
on officer graduate education requirements and programs.
This period was fraught with tremendous uncertainty. There
appeared to be serious disconnects in the process of
identifying graduate education requirements (The House
Appropriations Committee in 1978 described this process as
"artificial"); and the inability to control or ensure
utilization of offices with graduate education in positions
validated as a requirement.
This officer and the other system manager, Major (now
Lieutenant Colonel) Paul Terry set out to establish better
information and managerial control mechanisms. The result
was development of the U.S. Army Civil Schools Management
Information System (CSMIS)
.
In June 1984, this author was assigned to the Profes-
sional Development of Officer Study (PDOS) . This study's
purpose was to review commissioned officer education and
training needs 1985-2025 (see Chapter IV) . By this time,
this researcher was convinced that system management was not
the core of AGES shortcomings (Chapter IV) . The major
difficulty was the system itself—the policies and proce-
dures in the identification of graduate education require-
ments with regard to the benefits of graduate education
within an environment of how officers are utilized and
managed. Unfortunately, the combination of time (the study
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lasted only about six months) and interference of other
assigned duties, did not peirmit sufficient opportunity to
thoroughly research the subject. The goal of this thesis is
to conduct that research, identify specific shortcomings and
recommend solutions.
The methodology of research was an investigation of the
current system through a review of published studies,
Congressional reports and Army historical files, in conjunc-
tion with this officer's experience as a former system co-
manager.
Chapter II of this thesis investigates the costs and
benefits which accrue to graduate education. Chapter III is
a description of the functions, policies and procedures
associated with the operation of AGES today. Chapter IV
contains an investigation of DOD internal and external
reviews of officer graduate education programs since 1947.
Recurrent criticisms coupled with this investigator's
experience leads to specific conclusions as to system short-
falls. Based on these conclusions, the final chapter
(Chapter V) includes criteria upon which changes must be
based; and the recommended changes to the system. This
officer concluded that merely modifying the existing AGES
was not appropriate—that a system overhaul was the most
desirable, considering the criteria.
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B. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis was limited as follows:
1. Graduate education policies as pertains to Army Offi-
cer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) ^-managed
commissioned officers. This limits the investigation
from considering specific shortcomings and recommended
changes of other services' policies, programs and pro-
cedures; Army Special Branches policies, programs and
procedures; and other Army advanced civil schooling
programs which are not degree producing.
2. Validation of Army graduate education requirements and
utilization of commissioned officers obligated to
serve in validated positions. This thesis does not
include an investigation of other AGES components,
namely, schooling programs, determination of annual
schooling inputs, selection of officers to attend
full-time schooling, re-utilization of officers with
graduate degrees, selection of colleges and universi-
ties, or system management, except where these compon-
ents impact on validation and utilization issues.
ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions were made.
1. Total commissioned officer graduate education require-
ments are not being identified under the current
system.
2. Initial utilization rates of less than 100 percent of
officers with graduate degrees obtained through full-
time programs in validated positions is implicitly
unacceptable. It should be noted that neither DOD nor
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) has
established explicit acceptable utilization rates.
3. Congressional interest in and criticism of DOD officer
graduate education programs will continue, if not
accelerate, until system changes are made in the vali-
dation of requirements process.
^Non-OPMD managed officers are those in the Special
Branches—Judge Advocate General Corps, Chaplain Corps, and
Medical Corps. OPMD is a directorate of MILPERCEN.
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4.
Army officer graduate education values mirror those of
American society.
5. Army officers desire graduate education in order to
perform better vice pursuing graduate education in
order to improve post-service career opportunities.
6. Graduate education has functional and cognitive
values.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the shortfalls of the AGES, especially with
regard to its two major components, identification of
requirements and utilization of officers with graduate
degrees?
2 What changes are necessary to correct the
shortcomings?
These questions describe the bulk of this study.
13
II. THE VALUE OF GRADUATE EDUCATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate goal of any officer professional develop-
ment system is to strengthen and fortify the will,
character, knowledge and skills of those in the profession
of arms to preserve the future vitality of the Army and,
therefore, ensure the capacity to defend the Nation. While
willingness to anticipate and prepare for a changing system
is essential, a fundamental principle is that officers in
the profession of arms develop a vision of the nature of
future war, expect that it will occur, and personally
prepare to fight and win. Within this profession, all
officers:
- Are warriors who are fully prepared and eager to lead
and support in combat; are skilled in the use of
weapons, organizations and tactics; are able to inspire
confidence; and have the ability to accurately analyze
. problems and the boldness to take action to accomplish
the mission.
- Instill the values that form the basis for a distinct
life-style and code of behavior. Officers have good
character and are worthy of special trust; command
confidence and respect for their goal of excellence in
their profession; personally accept the responsibility
for protecting the nation and ensuring the morale and
welfare of their soldiers; are selfless and self-
disciplined to ensure their own moral and ethical well-
being are maintained.
- Personally and progressively master the art and science
of warfare while taking advantage of the education,
training, and mentoring available to them; build on the
fundamentals of the profession of arms by increasing
their knowledge and skills in tactics, strategy.
14
military history, and the human factors of war; learn
how to build cohesive teams, develop leaders, train to
win in combat, mobilize, deploy and sustain Army units.
- Learn and understand the environment
—
politics,
economics, technologies, philosophies and theologies--in
which the Army must effectively operate now and in the
future; establish a life-long pursuit of remaining cur-
rent in events and environmental factors; continue
development of personal ability to effectively lead the
Army and efficiently manage its resources across the
full spectrum of conflict.
- Are action-oriented in their thought processes—the
intellectual agility to think, plan, assess, and apply
judgment in making decisions; foster innovation through
bold, creative thinking; and ensure tasks are accom-
plished with the least expenditure of lives and
resources. (Professional Development of Officers Study
files, 1984)
The educating of an Army officer to master the art and
science of war is progressive, starting with the junior
second lieutenant up to the most senior levels of executive
leadership. All education must advance the individual's
acquisition of skills and knowledge to successfully execute
war, if it occurs. Figure 2-1 is a knowledge model for
officers. All officers must receive education and training
in troop leadership/command and staff skills associated with
their branch, functional areas and general military skills
—
all within a context to promote their war fighting acumen.
To produce officers with the requisite knowledge and
cognitive capacities to assume the Army's highest leadership
positions is accomplished through a combination of three
sources: Military schooling (professional and functional),
a variety of assignments and experiences, mentoring, self




Source: Author's unpublished manuscript
Fiaure 2-1 Knowledge Model
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The time to prepare for war is during peacetime—this means
developing and procuring machinery; developing
national and theatre strategies and tactics; training units;
and developing, training and educating the enlisted and
officer corps. Thomas Jefferson stated that to have a
democracy work without an educated and informed electorate
is something that never was or never will be. The same can
be said for the defense of the Nation
—
properly trained and
educated soldiers in the values of the Nation, the art and
science of war and the environment in which they live is a
prerequisite to the maintenance of peace and successful
execution of war. Parents have the right to expect that
during war their sons and daughters will be led by compe-
tent, educated military leaders—the best the services can
produce.
Nevertheless, there is considerable debate between
Congress and the services, and within the services as well
regarding how best to professionally develop the officer
corps. Some of this debate has historically focused on the
services' graduate education programs: What are the
specific requirements? How many should attend full-time?
How does one utilize these assets most effectively following
matriculation? What are the real costs and benefits? This
chapter will look at the costs and benefits of officer




Any cost-benefit analysis of the Army Graduate Education
System (AGES) would be very difficult. Costs are readily
available and many are quantifiable. But the measurement of
benefits is not easy; most are not quantifiable. Any cost
analysis must include not only the relatively minor costs of
tuition and fees (Army Fully-funded Programs)
,
but also the
more important and significantly larger alternative or
opportunity costs of foregone opportunities. Opportunity
costs must consider the salary and benefits (budgetary
costs) the officer receives while attending full-time
schooling and the loss to the operational manpower account
in terms of manyears officers spend in school.
1. Budgetary Costs
The Army Fully-funded Program (long course) for FY87
was budgeted at $8.7 Million (MILPERCEN files, 1986). This
money is used for new inputs and to continue those officers
in school for the previous year. This money pays tuition
and fees (i.e., $600 per annum, per student for texts and
supplies)
.
2 . Opportunity Costs
There are primarily two costs associated with this
category. First is the officers' pay and allowances. The
pay and allowances expended to produce the 650 officers with
graduate degrees inputed in FY85 in Army full-time programs




FULL-TIME ARMY GRADUATE STUDENTS PAY
AND ALLOWANCES FOR FYS 5 INPUTS
Total Pay and
Annual Individual Allowances to Pro-
Inputs Manyears -*- Pay & Allowances ^ duce 650 Graduates
650 1024.5 $35,959 $36.8 M
^* Computed separately for maximum allowable time for
each Army full-time program.
^* Used pay and allowances for captains over eight
years of service with dependents; Variable Housing Allow-
ances estimated at $2 00/month.
The second opportunity cost is the burden placed on
the operational account. For each officer in school means
that an officer is not available to serve in a battalion,
brigade or in any other authorized position. The average
number of officers in the schools account (for all schools,
military and civilian) September 1983-August 1984 was 6387
(Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (HQDA)
,
1984 files).-'- Fulltime graduate students represented about
15 percent of this total. ^ (See Appendix A for Transit,
Holding and Student (THS) data.) Since about ninety percent
of all fulltime graduate students are captains,
^Grades 01-06.
^Used 18 months as average program length (although
some programs are for 24 months) and 650 annual inputs.
This computes to about 975 graduate students in school per year.
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approximately 2 5 percent of the captain's student account is
in graduate school.
Table 2-1 also shows that for FY85 graduate school
inputs, the cost in manyears to produce graduate degrees for
650 officers is about 1,024 manyears. In comparison, the
cost in manyears for the Army's controversial Combined Arms
and Services Staff School (CAS-^)-^ is approximately 519
manyears'^—about half that of fulltime graduate programs.
C. BENEFITS
Whereas the costs of the Army's fulltime graduate
programs are measurable, measuring benefits in terms of
dollars and cents is not as easily accomplished. The
National Board on Graduate Education identified three basic
benefits of graduate education. They are: [Ref. l:p. 32]
• The education and development of skilled individuals.
• The production of knowledge
• The preservation and transmission of knowledge.
These benefits have application within a military context.
However the nature of the military establishment and the
need to develop its personnel within a closed system must
accrue additional benefits in order to justify these
programs. These benefits would include improved
^CAS-^ is a captain's level six week course to prepare
them for staff level work. It is controversial in terms of
the time the captain will be in school instead of on the
job.
^Goal is to input 4500 captains per year.
20
productivity; use of better problem solving and decision
making techniques; and less rigidity, prejudice and
stereotyping.
An economic analysis reveals that education provides the
individual and his society economic benefits. Theodore W.
Schultz studied the investment of education within the
civilian work force and the rate of return on this
investment. He estimated this return increases the Gross
National Product by .7 percent annually. [Ref. 2:p. 45]
Edward F. Denison established education as a major factor in
the nation's economic growth. He estimated it at .75
percent [Ref. 2: p. 44]). In other words, both Schultz and
Denison argue that formal education plays a major role in
increasing the aggregate productivity of workers. One can
conclude, therefore, that as an aggregate, more highly
educated workers are more productive than those with less
education.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that for males,
age 25, with five years or more college will have lifetime
earnings 12 percent greater than those within the same
cohort with just four years of college. For females, age
25, this figure is even higher, 44 percent. Table 2-2 shows
beginning salaries based on offers made by business,
industrial, governmental, non-profit and educational
employers. Of particular interest is the substantial
differences in wage offerings between bachelor's, master's
21
TABLE 2-2
MONTHLY SALARY OFFERS TO CANDIDATES FOR DEGREES







Accounting 1,565 1,891 (NA)
Business general 1,486 2,215 (NA)
Marketing 1,411 2, 122 (NA)
Engineering:
Civil 1,869 2,260 2,936
Chemical 2,228 2,404 3,130
Electrical 2,128 2,461 3,200
Mechanical 2,096 2,400 3,150
Nuclear 2,078 2,386 (NA)
Petroleum 2,568 (NA) (NA)
Engineering tech. 2,006 (NA) (NA)
Chemistry 1,712 2,203 2,694
Mathematics 1,799 2,124 2,585
Physics (NA) (NA) 2,903
Humanities 1,380 1,617 (NA)
Social sciences 1,320 1,606 (NA)
Computer science 1,941 2,359 (NA)
Source: Statistica 1 Abstract of th.e United States:
1985. U.S.. Department of Commerce , Bureau of
Census, 105th Edition, Washington, D.C., 1984
and doctoral degrees. For example, for the civil engineer-
ing field of study in 1983, master's level receives $381 per
month more than does the bachelor's level; doctorate
receives $1,067 more.
Many larger corporations across the U.S. have long
recognized the value of promoting education among its
employees. McDonnell Douglas will reimburse all tuition
costs for those individuals who complete a graduate program.
In 1983 the BDM Corporation paid tuition, fees and book
costs for 301 employees who attended courses leading to
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graduate degrees. [Ref. 3:pp. 19-21] Boeing Airplane
Company corporate policy states:
The management development program will emphasize self-
development by all managers, on-the-job development of all
managers, personal attention of each manager to the
development of his subordinates, and the integration of
these individual actions with organizational management
development under an overall system.
Nearly four percent of Boeing employees attended graduate
level courses in 1981 and 1982; 114 received graduate
degrees. [Ref. 3:pp. 19-21]
Based on the aforementioned data, education promotes
increases in productivity for the organization and
concomitant higher wages for the employee— and probably
improved promotion potential, also. One can safely assume
that increased productivity occurs in the military as the
educational levels of its servicemembers increases. Today,
a high school diploma is the minimum education level for
enlisted personnel entering the Army; a bachelor's degree is
a prerequisite for selection to major for Army officers.
[Ref. 4:p. S-4-2]
For the Army officer, economic improvement can only be
influenced by way of promotions. Army officer promotion
statistics indicate that graduate-level education improves
one's promotion potential. Lieutenant colonels boards use a
multiattribute decision-making model known as the Technique
for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (see
Appendix B for explanation) . This model applies six
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criteria to predict future success. These are (MILPERCEN
officials, October 1986)
:
(1) Military Education Level—professional military
schooling; for LTC ' s specifically, completion of com-
mand and staff college.
(2) Civilian Education Level.
(3) Quality—refers to quality of previous assignments.
(4) Performance—performance history from officer effi-
ciency reports.
(5) Physical fitness/military bearing and appearance.
(6) Potential.
Each promotion board member numerically rates each file
against these six criteria based on his predetermined
weighting for each one.
Table 2-3 shows the selection rates by civilian educa-
tion level of majors selected in the primary zone for promo-
tion to lieutenant colonel by the 1985 selection board. The
results indicate that selection rates are significantly
higher for officers with graduate education than those
without.
William J. Taylor Jr. , has suggested that there are
three pillars on which any argument for officer graduate
education must rest. These are: Scientific and managerial
skills, improve capabilities for human judgments and
inculcate national attitudes and values. Each is discussed
below. [Ref. 5:p. 164]
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TABLE 2-3
SELECTION RATES 1 BY CIVILIAN EDUCATION LEVEL,
19 8 5 ARMY LIEUTENANT COLONEL SELECTION BOARD
% Selected
% Considered w/applica-
# # w/applicable ble degree
Considered Selected degree level level
Doctoral 13 10 .7 77
Master '
s
1259 1060 63.6 84
Bachelor'
s
660 416 33.3 63
^Primary Zone
Source: MILPERCEN fi les, 1985
1 . Develop Technical and Managerial Skills
The society we live in has become tremendously more
scientific and technical since the launch of Sputnik. The
requirement for more sophisticated methods to problem
solving has steadily increased. Table 2-4 shows the growth
of college and university degrees 1960 to 1987 (projected)
.
A 1978 survey of senior executives (Table 2-5) shows
that managerial degrees, like MBA's, represent the predomin-
ant number, master's and doctorate, held. Ten years
previously, law degrees were more common than MBA's by a two
to one ratio. Now more than fifty percent of senior





NUMBER OF EARNED DEGREES PER YEAR IN THE U.S.
1960-61 TO 1986-87 (OOO'S)























Includes all medical, law and theology degrees
Indicates that the post-World War II boom has ended
Source: Projections of Education Statistics to 1986-87
.
National Center for Education Statistics, Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978,
p. 108.
TABLE 2-5
TYPE OF GRADUATE DEGREE HELD BY
SENIOR EXECUTIVES IN INDUSTRY
Chief
Bank Finance Executive Pers.
Pres idents President Officer Officer Officer
MBA 31% 58% 58% 43% 35%




22% 5% 15% 9% 30%
Doctor' 7% 4% 5% 9% 8%
Total 100% 100 = lOO: 100 = 100 =
Source: Heidrick and Struggles, Inc. , Graduate Educa-
tion Growth Among Senior Executives in Indus-
try , 1979, Chicago, Illinois, p. 15.
Similar growth has occurred in the electronics
industry. A 1978 survey of 40,000 professional engineers
indicated that 42 percent of supervisory engineers and 32
26
percent of non-supervisory engineers have graduate degrees.
This percent has grown by ten percent since 1968 and is
projected to grow during the next ten years (1988). [Ref.
6:p. 8]
A survey of the Army officer corps (grades 01-06) by
the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) in
1984 supports Taylor's pillar of the need for officers with
greater technical and managerial skills. When asked if a
graduate degree is necessary for proficiency in one of their
specialties, over 35 percent of the respondents with
advanced degrees "strongly agreed"; over 7 2 percent
"agreed." Doctoral level respondents felt that their degree
was "extremely" helpful in their current assignments at a
60.5 percent rate; master's level respondents, 41.9 percent.
Furthermore, nearly 80 percent of those individuals with
graduate degrees believe Army officers need advanced
civilian schooling "even if the Army does not fund"; among
all respondents there was a 70.0 percent agreement. [Ref.
4:p. S-6-1] Appendix C contains the responses to the
civilian schools portion of the PDOS Survey.
2 . Increase the Capability for Human Judgment
Military judgment and decisions are often character-
ized as being rigid, narrow-minded, based solely on pre-
established policies, regulations, field manuals and global
lessons learned. Decision making is consequently inductive
in nature—doing things a certain way because "that's the
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way we've done it in the past." But as the psalmist said,
"where there is no vision, the people perish." BG (Retired)
Peter Dawkins, in reference to this adage, believes there is
a need for the military to not only place emphasis on
"getting it done" but "thinking about it" as well— "why do
we do things the way we do?" "Is there a better way?"
[Ref. 7:p. 159]
Heavy reliance on inductive reasoning has a tendency
to limit discovery of new ways, new methodologies and new
solutions--movement away from an absolutist approach to
problem solving and decision making, and toward more
deductive means.
Adam Yarmolinsky believes there is a need for mili-
tary officers to be exposed to the current mainstream of
intellectual thought and activity associated with their
specialties. And that mainstream is civilian. Merely
rubbing shoulders on the job, military and civilian, is not
sufficient. Time must be spent in intellectual renewal of,
the interplay of theory to practice, study and action, and
between generalization and specific action, that maintains
the vital tension that keeps the profession alive and
growing. [Ref. 8:p. 152]
A full-time graduate program exposes the officer to
a variety of ideas and concepts which may be very different
from those to which he has been exposed. The individual is
challenged to rise to higher levels of intellectual thought
which forces him to critically analyze previous processes
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and methodologies—to find new approaches—to seek diverse
and more alternative approaches to problem solving.
Graduate schooling reduces the mental barriers in
which the military officer has previously operated and
generates a freedom of inquiry divorced from a solely
military context. The graduate school experience "involves
developing a mind-set oriented not to the answer but to
solutions." [Ref. 7:p. 160] It raises his frame of
reference in order to deal with a wide variety of complex
issues—within his military specialty and occupation and
outside, as well. [Ref. 9:pp. 1-16]
Elliott Jacques and T.O. Jacobs have done
considerable research in the development of executive
leadership. Of particular interest is Jacques' Stratified
Structure Theory (SSI) [Ref. 9:pp. 1-16]. SST is the con-
cept that work can be defined in terms of time frames in
which objectives are planned and accomplished. The time
frames in which work is completed varies by organizational
level, or stratum. For example, the time frame for a
general manager is much less than that for a chief executive
officer. Also varying by organizational level is the
cognitive capability one must possess in order to accomplish
work demands at his particular organizational stratum.
Cognitive capability has two components. They are,
"cognitive equipment"—knowledge, skills, temperament, and
values; and "cognitive power"— innate mental force. A
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person's cognitive capabilities are a factor which
determines at what organizational level one can successfully
operate. Jacques' research shows that one's cognitive
capabilities increase by age and can be measured and thus an
appropriate organizational level of work determined.
Cognitive capability which increases with age
theoretically can be improved through vigorous educational
experiences, especially cognitive equipment. One's
cognitive power can be improved also—to a point where the
individual's innate potential is maximized. Such
improvement could boost a person's cognitive capabilities to
an extent which would allow him to operate successfully at
the next higher organizational stratum at an earlier age.^
To test the hypothesis that graduate education
modifies officers' values and attitudes, Raoul Alcala
conducted a survey of Army, Navy and Air Force officers.
The results are summarized below [Ref. 10:pp. 133-149].
^Interviews on October 3, 1986 by the author with
Elliott Jacques, T.O. Jacobs, Major Larry Boyce and Jim
McGuire at the Army Research Institute (ARI) , Alexandria,
Virginia. During these interviews, Boyce and McGuire stated
that neither they nor other researchers are able to
empirically demonstrate the theory that cognitive capabili-
ties can be substantially improved through a vigorous
educational experience. However, they believe this
improvement does occur. For example, cognitive improvement
through education has long been recognized by private
industry. Firms' hiring, promotion and compensation
policies are often based on a combination of experience and




Officers with graduate degrees tend to be less
absolutist than those without. Army officers with graduate
degrees were 61 percent less absolutists; without graduate
degrees, 6 percent less (at a .10 significance level).
b. Diversity of Opinions
Officers with graduate education tend to have
more diverse opinions on complex issues than do those with
lower educational levels. Army officers with graduate
degrees displayed a wider standard deviation in the
distribution of responses dealing with approaches to world
peace, causes of war and the Vietnam rationale.
3 . Inculcate Societal Attitudes and Values .
The military community has traditionally physically
isolated itself from the surrounding population in which it
lives. Servicemembers live, shop and socialize within the
confines of the military installation. This separation has
been somewhat alleviated with the advent of the All-
Volunteer Army in the mid-1970 's and the resulting
substantial increases in military pay. The pay increases
provided an opportunity for more military families to buy
homes in the civilian community. However, in the 1980 's
economic conditions (weakening of military compensation and
high interest rates) have forced many military members back
into on-post military housing. Furthermore, the military,
still emerging out of the chaos of Vietnam, is still viewed
31
suspiciously in some quarters—especially among the academic
and intellectual segments.
The graduate education experience on a civilian
campus offers the opportunity for the officer to feel "the
pulse of the civilian society they serve— its problems,
fears, ideals and aspirations." [Ref. ll:p. 258] Having
officers on civilian campuses also cuts the other direction.
Civilian educators and students can learn about the military
profession. Stereotypes are erased through the exchange of
views, perceptions, etc. Often young professors and
students' negative preconceptions are significantly modified
after exposure to young, intelligent military officers.
Taylor and Bletz argue that "For this reason alone, there is
every reason to continue and expand the enrollment of
officers in full-time graduate school on campuses. . . ."
[Ref. ll;p. 259]
D. CURRENT ARMY OFFICER EDUCATIONAL LEVELS
As of 1985, 97.7 percent of all commissioned OPMD^
managed officers have bachelor's degrees; over 28.5 percent
have graduate degrees. Tables 2-6 and 2-7 show the OPMD
inventory education attainment levels for master's and
doctorate, respectively. The sources of these degrees are
contained in Table 2-8. Nearly 50 percent of all degrees
^OPMD—Officer Personnel Management Directorate,
MILPERCEN managed officers. This does not include Judge
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TABLE 2-8
SOURCES OF GRADUATE DEGREES (%)1
On Own Time (post accession) 48.3
Fully-Funded Program (FFP) 30.2
Cooperative Degree Program (COOP) 6.5
Preaccession 6.3
Degree Completion Program (DCP) 5.7
^ All commissioned officers, grades 01-06
Source: [Ref. 4:p. S-6-1]
are obtained by officers on their own. This would indicate
that officers value graduate education as a necessity for a
successful military career. This fact is further substan-
tiated by the fact that nearly 80 percent of the PDOS Survey
respondents believe that officers need graduate schooling
even if the Ariny does not fund (Appendix C) .
E. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the benefit of education for the Army officer
corps can best be summarized as follows:
Education . . . gives a man a clear conscious view of his
own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them,
and eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging
them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go
right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to
detect what is sophisticated, and to discard what is
irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post with credit
and to master any subject with facility. [Ref. 12 :p. 238]
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III. THE ARMY GRADUATE EDUCATION SYSTEM TODAY
Before an analysis of the Army's Graduate Education
System (AGES) can be made, one must understand how it
operates today from the identification of graduate education
requirements to the utilization and re-utilization of
officers with graduate education. There are seven functions
associated with the Army Graduate Education System, They
are:
a. Identification of specific requirements.
b. Establishment of full-time graduate education quotas.
c. Programs.
d. Selection of officers for graduate study.
e. Utilization of officers against specific requirements.
f. Re-utilization of officers against specific
requirements
.
g. Management information system (MIS)
.
A. IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC GRADUATE EDUCATION
REQUIREMENTS
The Army system for identifying graduate education
requirements is the Army Educational Requirements Board
(AERB) . This process is essentially similar for all the
services--the identification of specific positions which
require officers with graduate education (master's and
doctorates), captain (03) through colonel (06) "for optimum
performance of duties" [Ref. 13:p. 2]. This directive,
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Policies on Graduate Education for Military Officers (July
30, 1974), establishes DOD policies on identification of
specific graduate education requirements (by position) and
the utilization of qualified officers against these
requirements (i.e., validated positions). Although the
directive does not specifically call for the services to
validate requirements via an officially constituted board,
each service does so.
In order to better coordinate world-wide civilian
education requirements, the first AERB was conducted in 1963
under the direction of the Office for Personnel Operations.
The board consisted of eleven members from the Headquarters,
Department of the Army (HQDA) primary and special staffs.
AERB ' s were held annually until 1974 when it was decided to
hold boards triannually (zero base) with, as required,
"standby boards" in between, to review new requests for
validation. Figure 3-1 shows AERB validations 1964 to 1985.
In 1983 the board reverted to an annual review. The purpose
of the validation process, as stated in DOD Directive
1322.10, is to identify all positions, captain to colonel,
which require incumbents with graduate education for optimum
performance of duties. From this basic premise, the Army
process diverges from the directive.
1. The AERB validates positions at master's or doctorate
for commissioned officers; baccalaureate and master's







































































2. The AERB did not use the criteria contained in the
directive during its 1983 and 1985 boards as this cri-
teria (Appendix D) merely represents a categorization
of positions. The 1983 and 1985 boards used criteria
contained in Appendix E. Additionally, Army
Regulation (AR) 621-108, Military Personnel
Requirements for Civilian Education , states that
positions are appropriate for validation if the
expertise required of the incumbent is not available
through the Civilian Short Course Training Program or
the Army Training System. It should be noted at
this point that AR 621-108 contains the only criteria
provided originators of requests for validation.
3. Beginning in 1985, the AERB validated positions for
Training With Industry (TWI) , a non-degree producing
training program conducted in cooperation with select
private industries.
AR 621-108, Military Personnel Requirements for Civilian
Education, governs the policy and procedures for the identi-
fication of graduate education requirements and the filling
of validated positions. The Army Graduate Education System
today, as in 1963, is under the purview of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) , HQDA. He authorizes annual
AERB's, approves board scope, procedures, and results. The
Commander, US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) is
responsible for conducting the AERB. Proponents as members
of the board, act as advisors. [Ref. 14 :p. 2]
Conducting an AERB is a four phase process which
requires approximately nine months. These phases are
discussed below.
1. Phase 1, Preparation
During this phase, MILPERCEN generates an electrical
message to all Army activities, joint and unified commands,
other DOD services, and appropriate non-DOD government
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departments (for example, State Department) announcing the
convening of an AERB. This saturation approach is to ensure
that every governmental organization to which Army officer
personnel are assigned is aware of an upcoming AERB. A
great deal of lead time to the convening of an AERB is
necessary because of the tremendous workload in preparing
and reviewing the requests from the point of origination
through the chain-of-command. For example, in preparation
for the 198 3 AERB, the announcement of the board was made in
May 1982. Submission of requests were due to MILPERCEN in
August 1982 for a board held in January 1983.
Upon receipt of the requests at MILPERCEN, each is
reviewed for completeness and appropriateness by the AERB
action officer. "Completeness" refers to inclusion of all
pertinent data
—
position coding, grade, justification, etc.;
"appropriateness," to matching academic discipline to
controlling specialty. For example, the discipline, nuclear
effects engineering, supports the functional area. Nuclear
Warfare (FA 51) , but would not support the Functional area.
Personnel Management (FA 41) . Appendix F contains the
listing of all officer branches and functional areas with
associated supporting academic disciplines. Many positions
submitted were incorrectly coded. If the position's primary
duties are those associated with Foreign Area (FA 48) , it




Approximately ten percent of all submissions for the
1983 AERB were incomplete or inappropriate, therefore,
requiring return to originator. In other cases, the 1983
AERB made unilateral coding and grading change to individual
positions during its deliberations to ensure consistency.
Validation was approved pending changes to unit
authorization documents.
After the initial review by MILPERCEN, the requests
are collated by controlling specialty (branch or functional
area) and forwarded to the appropriate proponent.
Proponents are generally the branch or functional area
school commanders. For example, the Infantry proponent is
the Commander, U.S. Army Infantry Center and School, Ft.
Benning, Georgia. The proponent is the source of education
and training requirements and doctrine for particular branch
or functional area. The proponent determines which requests
are supportable and in order to effect standardization,
identifies like positions in like organizations for which no
request for validation was submitted. By November of 1982,
the proponents provided MILPERCEN the data pertaining to
each position which they recommended for validation at the
AERB.
2 . Phase 2 , Conduct of the AERB
The 1983 AERB was conducted in Alexandria, Virginia,
24-30 January 1983. (This author was the board recorder.)
This board represented two major departures from previous
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boards. First, board membership since 1963 was HQDA staff
proponent representatives. For most boards this consisted
of 8-12 voting members. Boards lasted 4-6 weeks.
Representation was based on departmental function
(operations, logistics, intelligence, etc.) rather than
overall officer professional development needs. In 1982,
the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) transferred pro-
ponency to primarily the training centers where training and
doctrine formulation occurs. Changing proponency from
departmental function to a specialty function, substantially
increased the specialization characteristics of proponency
and subsequently, the number of proponents. This change led
to a quantum increase in board membership. The 1983 AERB
was composed of 38 members. With the larger board, deliber-
ations only took seven days. The second major departure,
not independent of the change in proponency, was a move to
validate positions by officer specialties rather than aca-
demic disciplines. Previously, boards had validated solely
by discipline. For example, the 1981 AERB (a standby board)
validated 317 positions, captain to lieutenant colonel for
the academic discipline. Area Studies.^ The 1981 board's
report contains no break-out of validations by specialty.
The 1983 AERB departed from this procedure. It validated
-'The number of validations by discipline were the basis
for determining "shortage disciplines." Shortage
disciplines were disciplines for which AERB validations
exceeded inventory (more will be covered on this subject
later in this chapter)
.
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positions by officer specialty and associated disciplines
The 1983 AERB's results were approved by the DCSPER. The
results are contained in Appendix G.
A total of 4478 officer positions were validated of
which 17 were at the doctorate level (this does not include
121 military professor positions at the US Military Academy
—USMA which require doctorates) . (See Figures 3-2 and 3-
3 for a breakdown of validations by fields of study,
master's and doctorate levels, respectively.) USMA
requirements were established off-line and are not within
the scope of this thesis. This total, however, does include
18 Judge Advocate General Corps (JAGG) and 178 Chaplain
Corps master's level validations. The board reviewed a
total of 4619 officer positions; only 141 were rejected.
This represents a selection rate of .9l'^
.
Many were
rejected for being poorly written. It should be noted that
there were no documented cases of a request being rejected,
however, in the submission chain-of-command or by any pro-
ponent prior to the board. The conclusion, therefore, is
that the primary predictor for obtaining a position's vali-
dation is the preparation and submission of a request,
correlation coefficient of .97.
^The 1974 AERB had a selection rate of over .90. High
rates of approval by AERB's is not unusual.
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4818 Positions







PHYSlCAi. SCIENCE 281 5. 8X
HUUANITIES 292 8. ^X
Source: MILPERCEN files, 1984
Figure 3-2 Master's Degree Validations, 1983
AERB (OPMD managed only)
44
• 138 Total Positions
USMA 121
Other 17
• Few Positions; but
Increasing School
Quotas
BUSINESS 4 2. 9X
HUMANITIES n 9.*X
Source: MILPERCEN files, 1984
Figure 3-3 Doctoral Degree Validations, 1983
(OPMD managed only)
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3 . Phase 3, Notification/Validation Adjustments
Following board approval, MILPERCEN notifies
requesting agencies of the board's outcome—specifically
each organization's validations. Validated positions
require special handling by the owning organizations.
Authorization Documents (The Airmy Authorization Document
System—TAADS) must carry the notation indicating "validated
position." And personnel requisitions against validated
positions must likewise indicate its special status.
Furthermore, as in the case of the 1983 AERB, position
coding changes via TAADS must be made for positions
validated pending position re-coding or re-grading.
The Army is a non-static organization. This is
especially true for authorizations. As a unit's mission or
responsibilities change, as with any reorganization, corres-
ponding changes must be made in the unit's authorization
documents. This is most evident in the Table of Distribu-
tion Allowances (TDA) organizations which are non-standard,
non-combat types-^ . TAADS officials at HQDA estimate that
about ten per-cent of all authorizations are annually
modified. Of course any change to a validated position,
especially grade or coding, could affect its validation.
^Since over 90 percent of AERB validations are in TDA
organizations, the AERB Authorization File (validated
positions listing) is continually undergoing some change.
These changes are tightly coordinated between MILPERCEN and
field commanders.
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4 . Phase 4, Fill of Validated Positions
Organizations anticipating a vacancy or having a
vacancy, submit a requisition denoting validated position to
MILPERCEN. MILPERCEN is then tasked to identify an officer
with the appropriate specialty, grade, discipline (or since
1983, a discipline from a set which supports the required
specialty) and degree level (master's or doctorate) who is
available for assignment.
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF FULL-TIME GRADUATE EDUCATION QUOTAS
The establishment of quotas is closely tied to the
philosophy of how officers are professionally developed,
utilized and managed. The system to do this is the Army
Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) . OPMS was born
in 1972. Army leadership recognized that the Army was
becoming more specialized and technical and officer duties
more diverse. A more comprehensive system was needed.
The following is a brief description of this system.
Upon commissioning, lieutenants begin their development by
attending their branch (Infantry, Artillery, Quartermast-
er, etc.) basic course which provides them entry level
competencies associated with their branch. Some will
receive additional training like airborne, ranger, etc. The
officers initial assignment "should allow the officer an
opportunity to apply school training and develop leadership
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skills ... in troop units whenever possible." [Ref. 15 :p.
8]
During the captain phase the officer continues his
branch development. For many captains, they will be
designated a second specialty (i.e., functional area) in
addition to their branch specialty. This designation occurs
no later than the eighth year of commissioned service. By
the eighth year, most captains should complete "branch
qualification" (company command, if appropriate to the
branch's completion of the branch Officer Advance Course)
[Ref. 4:p. S-4-1] and become available for
training/education and duty in their designated functional
area. Functional areas are "a grouping of tasks or skills
which usually require significant education, training and
experience. Officers may not be accessed . . . into a func-
tional area." [Ref. 16:p. 20] Sixty-seven percent of all
AERB validations are in functional areas. Therefore, most
officers obtain full-time graduate schooling in disciplines
which support their functional areas. For example, combat
arms branch officers (Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Air
Defense), compose 34.9 percent of the total officer
inventory. However, AERB validations for these branches
represent only 3.7 percent. Table 3-1 shows the 1983 AERB
validations by arms and the functional area category.
Between the captain's sixth and eighth years, upon
completion of branch qualifications, is the ideal time for
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TABLE 3-1
VALIDATIONS BY ARMS CATEGORY, 198 3 AERB
Category Percent of Validations
Combat Arms 3 .
7
Combat Support Arms 2 3.6
Combat Service Support Arms 12.5
Functional Areas 60 .
2
100.0%
Source: MILPERCEN Files, 1984
graduate schooling. It represents a period of transition
and allows 10-12 years utilization after two years of
schooling prior to the 20 year retirement point.
The task for MILPERCEN is to determine how many captains
to send to graduate school, against what specialties and
combinations of specialties, in which academic disciplines
in order to develop an inventory at the grade of captain
which, as it depletes over the next 10-12 years (due to
separations and promotion passovers) , will still meet AERB
requirements for grades major through colonel.
Prior to FY83, the Army used a 2.4 "manning factor" to
determine inventory shortages by discipline. The "shortage
disciplines" then became the basis for annual graduate
school quotas. Each of the services continues to use a
manning factor although it varies by service. The "2.4" was
derived simply. The "2" recognizes that officers have two
49
specialties; the .4 allows for transit, holding and student
time (THS) . Table 3-2 is an example of how the manning
factor was used to determine discipline shortages and the
amount of deficiency for each. Appendix H contains a
listing of all shortage disciplines, by priority, against
which full-time graduate schooling quotas were established
for FY82. The Army abandoned this system in FY83 for the
following reasons:
1. Grouping of lieutenants/captains through lieutenant
colonels does not allow identification of specific
requirements and assets—most of the validations for a
particular discipline could be at the grade of captain
with assets on hand in the grade of lieutenant
colonel. Lieutenant colonels, of course, do not
occupy captain positions.
2. Does not correlate disciplines with officer special-
ties. For example, an officer listed as an asset
holding a master's in Area Studies may not hold a
specialty which is supported by this discipline.
Officers are managed and utilized by specialty, not
academic discipline. Therefore, this officer cannot
be considered an asset. One may query, why wasn't
this officer designated into a specialty which
correlates with his academic credentials? As
previously stated, officers will have been designated
their branch upon accession and their functional area
by the eighth year point. Many officers acquire
graduate education long after their eighth year
(through off-duty programs)
.
3. No consideration given to inventory development of
officers with graduate education.
For the FY82, fully-funded graduate education quota
development, MILPERCEN adopted an inventory development
method already being used to determine lieutenant accession
requirements by branch and captain functional area designa-
tion needs. The method used is the Future Army Requirements
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TABLE 3-2
SHORTAGE DISCIPLINE DETERMINATION, FYS
2
Aca- AERB X 2.4 Assets Less Less Net
Required Assets In (+)
—












*** FF := Fully Funded
(01-05)** FF*** (-) —
(03-05) Short
760 353 46 (-) 361
31 15 1 (-) 15
Source: MILPERCEN files, 1982
(FAR) model. FAR is based on officer continuation patterns
and is linked to utilization rates, career patterns, OPMS
management policy, and authorizations by specialty and
grade. FAR algorithmically determines, based on AERB
master's level validations by individual specialty and
appropriate utilization rates'* the number of captains to
send to master's level schooling. The goal is to develop an
inventory of captains which ideally will be of sufficient
size to satisfy future AERB requirements, captain through
colonel. Appendix I contains an example of the FAR method
"^The time an officer of a particular grade and
specialty can be expected to serve in a validated position
for his grade and specialty.
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as computed for FA 53 ADPS Management based on the 1980 AERB
results.
In this example, the desired utilization rates fall
within tolerance. This will not be true for all special-
ties, especially in cases where a higher grade's validations
are greater than a lower one. For example, if for FA 53,
the validations for colonel were double the validations for
major, a dilemma for the analyst will occur, as he will be
unable to work within acceptable utilization ranges and
satisfy all grades' requirements. Appendix I also contains
the computer-generated FAR output used for the FYS 3 Fully-
Funded Graduate Education Quota Plan. Seventy-five percent
of all specialties are out of tolerance. Generally the
analyst will optimize at the colonel's level because it
represents higher level decision makers. Unfortunately,
keying satisfaction on a higher grade will adversely affect
the initial utilization rates for captains and majors (i.e.,
more graduate degrees must be produced at the grade of cap-
tain and major than can be utilized in validated positions
—
which will violate DOD Directive 1322.10 initial utilization
policy. Furthermore, the FAR does not work for extremely
low validations as in the case for doctorates (17 total Non-
USMA in 1983). All doctorate validations are managed on a
case-by-case basis.
Since development of the FY83 quota plan, refinement of
the applicability of the FAR model continues. Instead of
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using just one set of utilization rates for all grades (.50-
.85) as was done in FY83, separate rates, based on
historical analysis, are now used for each grade. Figure 3-
4 shows the fiscal year fully funded inputs, 1982-1985. The
growth of fully-funded inputs since 1982 has been
significant with a 28 percent change. Two primary reasons
for this trend are the added emphasis on increasing doctoral
validations (17 validations, non-USMA in 1983; 78 by the
1985 AERB) ; and the establishment in 1984 of the
Technological Enrichment Program (TEP) which sends newly
commissioned lieutenants to graduate school in high tech
disciplines
.
As inputs have significantly increased, so too has the
budget. Figure 3-5 shows that the total budget 1980-1986
has tripled from $2.9 M to $9.3 M. The "long course"
(fully-funded programs) has increased from $2.4M to $7.8M—
a
225 percent change. "Short Course" monies (see "definition
of terms") have increased at a somewhat lower rate. Another
reason for the fully funded budget increases (beyond the
increase of annual inputs) is due to tuition and fee cost
rises (27 percent since 1980) . Unanticipated cost growths
required unfinanced requirements monies for FY85 and FY86
totaling $3 Million. A third cause of budget growth has
been the use of more prestigious and better universities—
MIT, Stanford, Harvard, etc., at the urging of the Vice
53




























Source: MILPERCEN files, 1985















Source: MILPERCEN files, 1985
Figure 3-5 Army Civil Schools Budget 1980-1986
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Chief of Staff of the Ainny and the recommendation of the




The AGES is a subset of the Army Advanced Civil
Schooling System (ACS) . All programs are for full-time
study. This includes the Fully-Funded Program (FFP) —Army
pays all tuition and fees; Degree Completion Program (DCP)
—
graduate and undergraduate (officer pays tuition and fees)
;
Cooperative Degree Program (COOP) , DCP programs conducted in
conjunction with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College (CGSC) and the U.S. Army War College (AWC) ; Training
With Industry (TWI) ; Army Degree Program for ROTC Instructor
Duty (ADPRID) —a DCS program to meet ROTC requirements;
Technological Enrichment Program (TEP) which sends newly
commissioned lieutenants for master's degrees; and assorted
scholarships, fellowships and grants. TWI and some
scholarships, fellowships and grants are not degree
producing.
D. SELECTION OF OFFICERS FOR FULL-TIME GRADUATE STUDY
Title 10, US Code, 1947 authorizes service secretaries
to have up to eight percent of the authorized strength in
civilian schooling. These constraints have never been
approached. In FY85 only about .01 of the active duty Army
officer corps was attending civilian schools.
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As previously discussed, the target population to send
to graduate school is captains between their sixth and
eighth years of commissioned service, in order to develop an
inventory of officers with the appropriate mix of
specialties and academic disciplines in order to meet future
requirements. MILPERCEN has the responsibility of managing
all student inputs and outputs. Once the annual quota plan
is completed, the MILPERCEN assignment divisions are
responsible for identifying and nominating officers against
the plan. The criterion for selection is as follows:
1. Career Timing. The officer has completed his branch
qualification, Officer Advanced Course and Company
Command. The latter does not apply to all branches.
2. Needs Match. The officer's desired discipline of
study supports his branch and/or designated functional
area; and a quota for the same exists.
3. Performance. The officer's manner of performance is
of the highest quality—not a promotion risk.
4. Acceptance. The officer has been accepted by an
accredited college or university, preferably one in
his home state in order to receive resident tuition
rates
.
5. Availability. Upon completion of civil schooling, the
officer will be available for an assignment to an AERB
validated position.
6. Prior Graduate Work. According to DOD Directive
1322.10, priority should go to those officers who have
completed the maximum number of transferrable credits.
Normally the maximum number of transferable
graduate credits between universities is only 14—
approximately one quarter worth.
The process for nomination varies by assignment division
in MILPERCEN but the above criteria are closely followed.
Generally the applicant's file is floated internally within
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each assignment division among assignment and professional
development action officers for concurrence. If favorably
considered, the nominated file is sent to the civilian
school's action officer for final approval and notification
of the individual.
The thoroughness of the selection process, according to
MILPERCEN officials, has precluded any measurable number of
dropouts or promotion passovers while in school.
E. INITIAL UTILIZATION OF OFFICERS
DOD Directive 1322.10 and Army Regulation 621-1,
Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions
govern the utilization of officers with graduate degrees
procured through full-time programs. The directive states:
[Ref. 13:pp. 5-6]
Officer personnel who attend graduate school under any
program of 2 6 weeks or more are considered funded. Unless
a different period is prescribed by law, they will agree
in writing that, upon completion of the education, they
will serve, and will be required to seirve, on active duty
for a period equal to three times the length of education
through the first year. Additional payback for education
in excess of one year will be determined by each Military
Service. Payback will be evaluated annually through
surveys and/or studies to insure that optimal utilization
and retention is realized.
And,
Officer personnel who have received funded graduate level
education will serve:
(1) One tour in a validated position as soon as practica-
ble after completion of such education, but not later
than the second tour. Particular emphasis should be




(2) As many subsequent tours in validated positions as
Service requirements and proper career development,
including command assignment, will permit. A mini-
mum of two tours is desirable.
The first paragraph refers to the "service obligation"
one incurs attending full-time study for 2 6 weeks or more,
i.e., "funded." It must be noted that the Army uses the
word "funded" as in the Fully-Funded Program (FFP) to denote
that the Army pays all tuition and fees {Ref. 17: p. 6]. The
Degree Completion Program (DCP) on the other hand is also a
"funded" program under the directive's criterion. However,
officers in this program fund their own tuition and fees.
[Ref. 17: p. 11] Army policy is that one incurs an
obligation of three years for each year of full-time study,
computed in days not to exceed six years [Ref. 17: p. 8].
This is tightly managed and few exceptions are made.
Paragraph two of the directive requires "funded"
officers to serve in validated billets for one "tour"— in
order to maximize initial utilization and then to be
subsequently re-utilized. The Army defines a tour as three
years [Ref. 17 :p. 12]. Approximately six months prior to
graduation, the officer receives orders from MILPERCEN
assigning him to a particular command. The special
instructions on the orders advise the receiving commander of
his requirement to place the individual in an AERB-validated
position and identifies (by unique AERB position number) the
specific position. Failure by the commander to put an
"AERB-obligated asset" in a validated position; or to remove
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an obligated asset from a validated position without
MILPERCEN authority can cause the loss of the position's
validation. Since the advent of the AERB, there are no
documented cased of a position losing a validation because
of a commander's failure to comply.
In order to effect "payback," two hurdles must be made
—
MILPERCEN placing the officer on orders to an AERB
assignment, and the local commander actually placing the
officer in a validated position and leaving him there for
the duration of the tour.
The directive and MILPERCEN policy provides flexibility
in that utilization can be deferred to the subsequent tour
following completion of schooling. Such flexibility allows
the Army to meet immediate operational needs; imperative
career requirements of the officer (executive/operations
officer time, other troop duties, etc.); compassionate
requirements (joint domicile, family or medical needs,
etc.); and professional schooling demands like Command and
Staff College (CSC)
.
Prior to 1983, MILPERCEN level deferrals were negotiated
at the action officer level, often verbally with little, if
any, documentation. Consequently, the later identification
of previously deferred officers was difficult to accomplish.
In 1983, deferral requests and approvals were elevated to
the division chief level (colonels) at MILPERCEN and
required detailed written justification. This improvement
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was facilitated by the initial implementation of the
Civilian Schools Management Information System (CSMIS)
.
CSMIS provided an automated means of managing and
controlling the assignments of AERB obligated assets.
Electronic "inhibit flags" are placed on each obligated
asset's file at the time they are sent to graduate school.
The inhibitor precludes the MILPERCEN assignment of an
obligated asset to a non-validated position without an
approved deferral; or the MILPERCEN assignment of an
obligated asset out of a validated position prior to
completion of a 36 month tour without an approved deferral,
e.g., curtailment. Although the advent of CSMIS and the
need for written justification at a higher managerial level
may appear bureaucratic and cumbersome, it is necessary in
order to ensure utilization under the existing DOD directive
and Army regulations.
The utilization management policies and procedures
established in 1983 did little to improve, however, the
utilization management on the local/command level. Tradi-
tionally, the field commander has had the right, inherent
with his command authority, to assign, utilize and employ
his personnel resources as he sees fit and deems necessary
in order to accomplish the unit's assigned or implied tasks
and missions. This right is inviolate. Who better under-
stands the needs of the unit better than its commander? As
a consequence, this problem continues to exist.
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F. REUTILIZATION OF OFFICERS
The DOD directive suggests a minimum of two subsequent
utilization tours. Although MILPERCEN has no specific
management procedures to ensure reutilization, the FAR
model's calculations are based on developing an inventory of
graduate degree holders at the grade of captain which will
be of sufficient size and mix (specialties and disciplines)
to meet future AERB requirements for grades major through
colonel. The grades lieutenant colonel and colonel are the
ranks at which reutilization will occur. Use of the FAR
should automatically force reutilization without any
additional managerial procedures.
G. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
The development of the Civil Schools Management
Information System (CSMIS) began in 1982. Initiation of
this effort was precipitated by MILPERCEN officials' reali-
zation that management of requirements (AERB-validated
positions) and utilization of assets needed improvement.
Manually managing approximately 5000 positions and 650
graduate degree outputs per year was impossible for a staff
of less than three individuals. Considering that increasing
the size of the management staff would not be favorably
considered or even represent a potential solution, ADPS with
the appropriate checks and generation and management of
information could help solve AGES shortfalls. The scope of
this thesis is not appropriate for a detailed explanation of
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CSMIS, except to say that an MIS was sorely needed to assist
MILPERCEN managers satisfy DOD policies, especially with
regard to requirements and utilization management.
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. EARLY STUDIES
Since the Civil War, the services have recognized the
need for advanced civilian schooling in order to prepare
officers for the increasingly complex and technological
nature of the maintenance of peace and successful execution
of war. Complexity is increasing rapidly within the
scientific/technical, economic, geopolitical and managerial
arenas
.
The early years of the services' emphasis on graduate
education following World War II received impetus from a
series of review boards which met to study officer
professional development needs. A summary of these boards'
findings/recommendations are summarized below.
1. Gerow Board
This board met in 1945-46. Its primary conclusion
regarding officer graduate education was that it was eco-
nomically infeasible to duplicate education in military
schools which could be provided through civilian colleges
and universities. This recommendation is the source of the




This board met in 1949. It established a require-
ment that ninety percent of Regular Army officers should
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have baccalaureate degrees; and that the Army provide offi-
cers an in-service opportunity to obtain their degrees.
[Ref. 19 :p. 20] This led to the "Bootstrap" program which
allowed officers to attend civil schooling full-time to
complete their bachelor degrees. This program remains in
effect today, except that the officer must now fund the
tuition and fees. The board also recommended that selected
officers be provided an opportunity to acquire graduate




The Williams board held in 1958, observed that offi-
cers who obtain full-time graduate education should do so
for ultimate assignment to specific positions which require
these skills. However, the board felt that graduate educa-
tion programs had a secondary, positive effect, namely the
improvement of the educational level of the officer corps,
particularly with regards to social, political, economic and
scientific areas. Justification for these programs must
include both primary and secondary benefits. The board con-
cluded that with the rise in technology, graduate education
inputs must likewise increase. [Ref. 21:pp. 52-55]
4 Haines Board
The Haines Board meeting in 1966, reached two
conclusions which address graduate education. First, the
Army must continue its reliance on civilian colleges and
universities to educate officers in disciplines which.
65
although not directly military oriented, have military
applications and that the Army would continue to be unable
to attract a sufficient number of men already possessing
graduate degrees. Second, this board recognized a need to
improve utilization rates, and validation procedures. A
major difficulty identified in the validation process was
the lack of precise standards to assist field commanders
deter-mine their organization's graduate education needs.
[Ref. 22:pp. 680-697]
5 . POD Officer Education Study
Also in 1966, the same month the Haines Board
reported its results, the DOD Officer Education Study
published its report. This study found that a better method
was needed to forecast long range graduate education needs
and came to a similar conclusion of the Haines Board—that
subordinate commanders need more precise standards in order
to identify graduate education requirements. [Ref. 23: pp.
366-367]
By 19 66, there were indicators that a need for
improvements in the Army Graduate Education System existed.
However, it was not until 1970 that forces external to the
DOD became involved in the services* management of graduate
education programs. These outside agencies were the General




Although there is general consensus by the GAO, 0MB and
Congress that a need exists for military officers to possess
postgraduate education, there has been significant criticism
of how the services determine their requirements and how
they utilize their assets. This concern grew from the
magnitude of the programs costs estimated at $70 Million in
FY69. (This includes total costs, budgetary and opportunity
for all services' funded programs to meet approximately
3,000 validations. In 1969 over 4200 officers were enrolled
in full-time, fully-funded programs. There were indications
that both the number of validations and costs would continue
to grow [Ref. 24:pp. 3-4]. Because of the program costs and
future uncertainty, the GAO initiated the first external
review of these programs. The purpose of the study was as
follows:
A Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum established criter-
ia in 1964 for determining graduate education requirements
for military officer positions. To fill these positions
over 4,200 officers were enrolled during fiscal year 1969
in full-time graduate education programs at an estimated
cost of at least $70 million. Because of the amount of
funds being spent, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
reviewed the graduate education program to see whether the
positions required the extra education and whether offi-
cers' training was adequately used. [Ref. 24 :p. 1]
The 1970 GAO Report directed its criticism to the following
areas.
1. Criteria for Validation
The criteria for the identification of requirements
was too broad and permissive. A case for validation could
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be made for practically any position. The services appeared
to equate positions where graduate education was "desirable"
with positions where it is "essential." "Essential," as
defined in the report, are those positions where graduate
education is prescribed by law (like medical doctors) or
positions, the duties of which can only be performed "satis-
factorily" by an incumbent with graduate education. "Desir-
able" criteria should only be for those positions where a
degree of incumbent prestige is required or a graduate
degree is necessary for optimum performance. By using the
criteria of desirability, the services were greatly
inflating requirements. [Ref. 24: pp. 20-21] DOD Directive
1322.10, Policies on Graduate Education for Military
Officers
. July 1974, continues to maintain a validation
criteria policy which ensures "that officer positions are
validated for graduate education where such is essential for
optimum performance of duties." [Ref. 13 :p. 2] In other
words, general criteria used today falls within the
"desirability" criteria as defined and condemned by the GAO
in 1970.
2 . Inconsistencies of Criteria
Criteria were not consistently applied throughout
the department or even consistent within the services. Some
positions of like responsibilities and duties were
validated; others were not. The 1983 AERB was specifically
tasked to standardize validations. As a result, 521 of 4478
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total validations in 1983 were approved based upon
standardization. The criteria used by this board were





Acceptable alternatives to full-time graduate study
like work experience or short training courses were not
considered were not being considered by the services. The
GAO argued that alternative types of training should be
considered in order to reduce costs. Furthermore, the
services should make use of civilian personnel for purposes
of continuity and stability. GAO found that comparable
civilian positions to validated military positions did not
have graduate degree requirements. The reason being that
the U.S. Civil Service Commission substitutes experience for
formal education. The study implied that the services
should adopt a similar strategy.
4 Other Inconsistencies
Inconsistency between actual position requirements
and requirements contained in the requests for validation.
The validation process was not able to intercept inflated
requests.
5 Malutilization
The services did a poor job of assigning officers
with specialized graduate education to validated positions
in order to ensure maximum benefits. The GAO investigated
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703 validated positions at 14 installations. Of the 703
validated positions, only 162 or 23 percent were occupied by-
individuals possessing graduate degrees (see Table 4-1)
.
TABLE 4-1
GAO UTILIZATION FINDINGS [Ref. 24 :p. 22]
Incumbent Education Level
- Master's Degree or higher








The GAO comment regarding this finding was as follows:
At the locations we visited, the under-utilization of
officers with advanced degrees was accentuated by the fact
that individuals with less than master's degrees occupied
437 positions and vacancies existed in 104 positions
which, according to the military services, required gradu-
ate education at the same time that 344 officers with
graduate degrees were assigned to other nonvalidated
positions. Some of these officers with graduate degrees
could reasonably be expected to satisfy the educational
and grade requirements of the validated positions at the
bases at which they were assigned or they could have been
assigned to other bases with positions requiring graduate
degrees in the pertinent academic areas. [Ref. 24: p. 22]
The DOD response to the GAO Report regarding the
identification of requirements and utilization demands
raised a basic question which even today has not been
adequately resolved, namely, is the sole purpose of graduate
education programs only to meet specific requirements or
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should broader, more universal benefits also be considered?
The DOD response follows:
While recognizing the importance of the criteria, we
believe the GAO Report has overlooked a very important
element in the education and training of military
officers. The report does not recognize sufficiently that
graduate education is more than training in a particular
skill— important as that may be. Education is a
continuing way of life and within the Military Services it
contributes to the intellectual development of officers.
Graduate education imparts to the student advanced techni-
cal knowledge. More importantly, it helps broaden his
capacity for original thought and promote the development
of analytical tools for problem solving.
As a general observation, therefore, we believe that
the draft report is too limited in its considerations of
the utility of education. Of particular concern is the
failure to acknowledge:
(a) the rising educational aspirations of the segment
of the population from which we must recruit military
officers
.
(b) the value of graduate education in our junior
officer retention efforts.
(c) the increased capability which an officer with
graduate level education brings to billets which he may
occupy outside of the limited range of positions validated
for his academic credentials. [Ref. 24 :p. 32]
GAO ' s comment to this response was that the DOD's
system of identifying graduate education needs was based on
specific positions rather than a broader basis as argued in
their response. GAO further argued that considering the
cost of graduate schooling programs, the only valid justifi-
cation for their existence is requirements based upon a cri-
terion of "essentiality"— for satisfactory performance of
duties.
71
Before the 1970 GAO Report, HQDA had already taken
steps to improve its utilization rates. Prior to 1970, uti-
lization tracking had rested with each assignment branch
(i.e., Infantry Assignment Branch, Quartermaster Assignment
Branch, etc.). But in 1970, the management of tracking
utilization was centralized under the Deputy for Career
Development, Officer Personnel Directorate, Office of Per-
sonnel Operations. Furthermore, plans were initiated to
develop an automated utilization tracking system-^. Prior to
this change. Army-wide statistics were not maintained [Ref.
26:p. 43]. However, Office of Personnel Operations revealed
that of a sample of 2000 officers who obtained graduate
degrees from 1960-1964,
83.9 percent received some type of utilization assignment
. . . as of June 1972 of 1847 officers requiring
utilization . . . 1511 (82 percent) were assigned to
initial utilization positions, 299 (16 percent) were
deferred . . . and 37 (2 percent) were not properly
utilized. [Ref. 26:pp. 44-45]
The 1970 and 1972 figures are essentially identical. One
would question whether centralized tracking was the
solution. Utilization criteria, as stated in Chapter III,
has two hurdles. First, the assignment by MILPERCEN of an
obligated asset to a validated position; and second, the
field commander actually using the asset in a validated
position. In 1970 this second part to the utilization
^By 1982, no such system was in place. CSMIS was
designed to correct this deficiency.
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equation was not even considered today remains unsolved,
despite CSMIS.
DOD's reply further argued that the utilization of
officers with graduate degrees in specific billets ignored
other demands. These are the need to meet a large variety
of requirements; and the need to professionally develop
officers, not just through education and training programs,
but also via rotation through a variety of assignments and
experiences. GAO apparently was unimpressed. Their reply
stated:
DOD has indicated little early corrective action in
response to GAO ' s major findings and suggestions. In view
of DOD's position and the announced plans of the military
services to expand the graduate education program, GAO
believes that the Congress may wish to consider limiting
the full-time, fully funded graduate level education
program (1) to those positions for which such education is
essential for the satisfactory performance of duty and (2)
to only those officers who can be used primarily in those
positions. [Ref. 24:p. 3]
In summary, the GAO Report of 197 increased concern
regarding DOD's management of the graduate education
programs at the Secretary's level and in Congress. In 1971,
the first comprehensive policy statement by the DOD was
issued. This statement was DOD Directive 1322.10, Policies
on Graduate Education for Military Officers , March 27, 1971.
This document was the forerunner of the current directive,
dated July 30, 1974. This directive contained guidance
based on the 1970 GAO study. The 1971 directive established
validation criteria, guidelines for utilization, and
alternatives to fully-funded programs. Apparently, DOD
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hoped to make graduate education more economical and lessen
potential criticism regarding schooling costs. In 1971,
General Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army,
commissioned a review to consider officer professional
development needs for the 1970 's. This was the Norris
Board. The Norris Board analyzed graduate schooling from a
pro-con standpoint. The advantages were as follows:
(1) Allows for efficient management.
(2) Increases retention of highly capable officers.
(3) Increases the educational level of the office corps
thereby improving the Army's capability to deal with
increasing technology.
(4) Circumvents educational obsolescence—keep the Army
abreast with latest academic developments.
(5) Improves the Army's prestige.
(6) Conforms to national educational trends. [Ref.
27:pp. 7-8]
The negative aspects:
(1) Incurs high manpower and financial costs.
(2) Divides officer interests between civil schooling
and professional military schooling.
(3) Promotes a "sheepskin" sweepstakes—ticket punching
and careerism nature of graduate schooling.
(4) Increases political vulnerability—reference to GAO
and congressional interest in DOD ' s graduate
education programs.
(5) Increase administrative workloads—the tremendous
amount of administrative work required at all
echelons from the identification of requirements to
the management demands associated with meeting
utilization policies. [Ref. 27:pp. 8-10]
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The Norris Board concluded that despite the afore-
mentioned negative aspects, the Army could ill afford to
eliminate full-time funded graduate degree programs, espec-
ially when considering retention and motivation of young
highly intelligent officers—that limiting one's education
to only baccalaureate degrees would not satisfy officers of
the 1970 's; and when considering the need to maintain a
technically competent Army, there was a growing need to
develop officer specialists. Other conclusions were that
the Army could not continue to primarily meet graduate
education requirements through fully-funded programs
(referring to the Army paying tuition and fees for full-time
graduate students) . Greater use must be made of the Degree
Completion Program (DCP) , the Advanced Degree Program for
ROTC Instructor Duty (ADPRID) , cooperative degree programs
(COOP) at the Army Command and General Staff College and
Army War College. The Norris Board recommended the
establishment of assignment policies which would promote
officer continuance of off-duty studies concurrent with
their duty assignments. [Ref. 27: pp. 11-14]
In Congress, the 1970 GAO Report provided a basis
for questions posed to DOD witnesses by the House Appropria-
tions Committee during hearings concerning the 1971 budget.
[Ref. 28:pp. 29-31, 190-196, 297, 386-389] Specifically,
interest surrounded the selection process of officers for
graduate schooling, service obligations incurred.
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resignation rates of participants, validation procedures and
utilization policies.
In 1972 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Education sponsored a study to reexamine the basic
philosophy of graduate education programs and access each
services' compliance with the 1971 DOD directive. The study
concluded that increasing budget constraints required a
greater use of alternative graduate degree sources to the
fully-funded programs. Additionally, the study concluded
that the services need to improve in the utilization of
officers with graduate degrees. [Ref. l:p. 1-5]
Congressional hearings on the FY72 budget did not
specifically address officer graduate education. The record
of hearings by the House Armed Services Committee for the
FY73 budget shows considerable interest, from a macro
standpoint, regarding total military training and education
costs. These costs exceeded $6 Billion for FY71. Their
report made the following observations:
The Committee, in its review of manpower strengths,
touched upon the question of training costs. Although
evidence presented to the Committee indicated that these
training costs are well in excess of $6 billion annually,
no witness before the Committee was capable of providing
precise cost estimates.
In view of these circumstances, and since the training
cost figures provided the Committee probably do not
reflect many related costs, such as travel, special
allowances, facilities costs, et cetera, it is reasonable
to assume that training expenditures are far in excess of
$6 billion. Therefore, recognizing the huge cost of
training personnel and likely abuses in this area, it is
the view of the Committee that this element of the depart-
mental budget is a very likely source of future savings.
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. . . These circumstances, together with the fact that
there presently exists no statutory limitation on the kind
of training or the amount of training which can be pro-
vided personnel by the Armed Services concerned, demands
the annual scrutiny and attention of the Congress by the
responsible committees. [Ref. 29:pp. 81-82]
The concerns of the 92nd Congress regarding military and
education costs led to the passage of Public Law 92-436
which states:
(1) Beginning with the fiscal year which begins July 1,
1973, and for each fiscal year thereafter, the Congress
shall authorize the average military training student
loads for each component of the Armed Forces. Such
authorization shall not be required for unit or crew
training student loads, but shall be required for student
loads for the following individual training categories:
recruit and specialized training; flight training; profes-
sional training in military and civilian institutions; and
officer acquisition training; and no funds may be appro-
priated for any fiscal year beginning on or after such
date for the use of training any military personnel in the
aforementioned categories of any component of the Armed
Forces unless the average student load of such component
for such fiscal year has been authorized by law.
(2) Beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973,
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a
written report not later than March 1 of each fiscal year
recommending the average student load for each category of
training for each component of the Armed Forces for the
next three fiscal years and shall include in such report
justification for and explanation of the average student
loads recommended. [Ref. 30:p. 6]
In accordance with the provisions of this law, a
Military Manpower Training Report was submitted to Congress
as part of the FY74 DOD budget. It contained FY74 through
FY76 training loads to include those for graduate education.
Extensive testimony by DOD officials was given to members of
the House Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations
Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. For the
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first time, evidence exists that Congress had become highly
critical of DOD graduate education programs. Whereas
hearings on the FY71 budget had been primarily information
gathering; and FY73 budget hearings had been critical of
total training and education costs, the FY 1974 budget
hearings found fault with specific aspects of the management
of DOD graduate education programs. Criticism keyed on the
diversity of disciplines^; the use of graduate education as
an incentive for retention; the convergence of status
associated with graduate degrees; and the extent to which
taxpayers should foot the bill; and the inflationary
validation process.
The House Armed Services Committee reported:
The Committee is not convinced that all of these billets
do, in fact, require the holding of advanced degrees. Nor
is the Committee convinced that the incumbents need be
military officers educated at government expense as
opposed to civilians who have acquired their degrees prior
to being employed.
The Committee recognizes that there is a valid need for a
well-educated officer force but rejects the concept of
advanced education per se as a benefit which must be
available in order to attract and retain officers. [Ref.
31:pp. 5613-5614]
The House Appropriations Committee, likewise,
reported:
^Recall from Chapter II that positions are validated by
specific discipline. Technically this means that only an
officer holding a graduate degree in that specific disci-
pline is qualified for assignment to that position. This
methodology requires a larger inventory of officers with
graduate degrees—the basis for this Congressional
criticism.
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The military services have designated 24,845 positions
which require that the incumbent hold an advanced
degree. . . . The Committee's review of the graduate
training program raised serious questions with regard to
the validity of the requirements for officers with
graduate degrees, and the scope of the training program.
[Ref. 32:pp. 44-45]
As a result of this criticism, a 20 percent reduc-
tion in the DOD ' s training load and training budget was
directed by Congress. These criticisms levied by Congress
must be placed in an appropriate context. By 1973, U.S.
military involvement in Vietnam had been tremendously
reduced. Congress realized that the military must drasti-
cally reduce its manpower and spending from a pseudo wartime
footing to a peacetime one. Furthermore, Congress was
dominated by a dove-oriented membership representing consti-
tuencies tired of the war, many believing the U.S. military
had botched it. Also, economic news for FY74 was not good.
Many economists were predicting a recession and, therefore,
a serious downturn in revenues. Cost cutting was the order
of the day.
In 1974, the GAO undertook a follow-up study of its
1970 report. This report acknowledged improvements were
made but reiterated its discontent with the fully funded
programs [Ref. 33: pp. 1-2].
In 1974, DOD Directive 1322.10, Policies on Graduate
Education for Military Officers was revised which placed
greater emphasis on alternatives to fully-funded programs.
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The Office of Management and Budget (0MB) actively
entered the picture in 1974, commissioning a study of
officer graduate education policies and practices. Their
investigation recommended elimination of the position
validation process, establishment of educational standards
by officer occupations and periodic reviews by oversight
panels [Ref. l:p. vii]
.
In 1977, at the direction of the CSA, a study of
Army officer professional development was conducted. The
study, a Review of Education and Training for Officers
(RETO) found that the Army's graduate education system,
specifically utilization policies under which the Army
operates, are untenable. The policy of payback measured
solely by utilization in exact positions has "defined
ourselves into a position of appearing to be poor mangers."
[Ref. 34:p. 184]
From 1974 to 1978, Congressional criticism
continued. The House Appropriation Committee (HAC) in 1978
(for FY79 budget) excerpted the HAC report for FY76. The
FY76 report stated:
The data available to the Committee indicates that a
large portion of the graduate education program is not
really essential to the military services. The nature of
the validation process is extremely subjective and pro-
vides an opportunity for local unit bases or installation
commanders to request a graduate trained officer for
"maximum effectiveness" while at the same time increasing
the prestige of the incumbent. In some respects graduate
education has become just another ingredient in a
successful officer career even though in many cases it
cannot be shown that this additional training is
necessary.
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Most military officers, because of the forced retire-
ment system, must seek a second career. Certainly,
graduate education is an exceptionally good way to prepare
for that second career. As the panel of the National
Academy of Public Administration says, 'while officers,
like other Americans, may make too much of a degree as a
convenient, portable, and salable credential, the services
should distinguish the level of education which is
necessary for military effectiveness from that which
enhances the officer's personal satisfaction.'
It is obvious from the discussion above that the Com-
mittee does not support the current validation process.
. . . The point must be made that a master's degree is
just an indication of civilian educational attainment and
may or may not have relevance to the needs of the military
services. Officers must be judged on their ability to
perfoirm as professional military men, and that portion of
the training and education which goes into making a
professional soldier must be included in the equation.
[Ref. 35:pp. 28-29]
The 1978 HAC also specifically criticized the services' use
of manning factors-^ with regard to inventory development.
For example, Army data provided the HAC indicated an
inventory requirement of 2209 personnel with graduate
degrees in social disciplines, with an existing inventory of
5833 officers with social graduate degrees^. Yet between
fiscal years 1977 through 1979, the Army sent 169
individuals per year to graduate schools in the social
sciences. The other services were similarly cited. [Ref.
36: p. 2 5].) Furthermore, the report cited the fact that
-^The Army and Marine Corps used a factor of 2.4; Air
Force, 1.3; and the Navy, 1.2 to 2.0 depending upon the
grade and position designations.
'^See Chapter II for discussion of problems associated
with Army use of manning factors. The 58 3 3 inventory may
represent primarily senior grade officers whereas the inven-
tory requirement of 2209 may be based on validations at the
more junior grades (captain and major)
.
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since 1970 the average strength of military officers had
declined 33% while validations declined by only 28%. [Ref.
36: p. 25] Obviously, the HAC believed the services'
education requirements were overstated and inflated. As a
result of the above, the HAC recommended a ten percent
budget reduction and directed the DOD respond to the
following HAC recommendations by December 1978:
(1) Review the validation process with a view toward
significant reductions. Consideration should be given to
replacement of the validation process with a system of
specific educational objectives for officers of like
career designation which is divorced from the artificial
degree requirement currently in use.
(2) Reassess the necessity for operating both the Naval
Postgraduate School and the Air Force Institute of Tech-
nology. If an analysis of both operational and economic
considerations dictates continued operation of one or both
management controls should be established to insure that
proper utilization of these educational institutions is
made by all services prior to reliance on civilian
institutions. Any reduction deemed necessary from the
budgeted program for the Naval Postgraduate School and the
Air Force Institute of Technology are not to be made prior
to submission of the requested plan.
(3) Increase the use of permanent civilian faculties
with advanced degrees at the service schools and
academies. This would reduce the requirement for military
officers to obtain advanced degrees simply to be qualified
to teach and where the possibility of reutilization of the
required skill is remote.
(4) In conjunction with establishing a system of
specific educational objectives for individual officers,
implement a system of priorities for the use of tuition
assistance funds for education and training in specific
shortage areas. [Ref. 36:p. 29]
In order to study and respond to the HAC recommenda-
tions, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(OASD) formed a full-time study group in late 1978 composed
of representatives from each service, with its report
forwarded to the HAC in January 1979 (with approved suspense
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extension) . The only issue of the four HAC recommendations
which is applicable to the scope of this thesis is recommen-
dation 1, concerning the validation process. DOD officials
stated:
Because the majority of military officers come from back-
grounds like those of civilian business leaders, both
groups can be expected to share many common values,
including their aspirations for education. ... In
short, the DOD graduate education program can be more
fully understood in light of trends and developments in
the larger society." [Ref. 37 :p. 1 of End. 2]
These trends indicated a four-fold percentage increase in
the graduate education levels of major corporations' chief
executives in the previous 25 years; that between one-third
to one-half of high level executives have graduate degrees;
and that the number of graduate degrees among the civilian
sector is expected to continue to rise, especially in
business and management. [Ref. 37:pp. 3-5] Additionally,
the "short life" of graduate education dictates continuance
of annual schooling inputs. With regard to validation
procedures, the report notes that the number of validations
has been decreasing as the services become more technical.
[Ref. 37 :p. II-2] The report's conclusions and recommenda-
tions (draft) are contained in Appendix J. As of 1984, none
of the OASD recommendations were in operation within the
Department of the Army. Specifically there were no
prioritization of positions; no differential manning factors
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by grade and specialty^; and no inventory review of officers
with usable and non-usable degrees was accomplished until
1983 as part of the development of the Army CSMIS Asset
File.
Unfortunately, the OASD response did not capitalize
on an opportunity to revamp the validation and utilization
system. HAC recommendation 1 suggested that the services
establish graduate education objectives by career field
(e.g., for the Army, branch and functional area) and then
presumably educate the appropriate number in accordance with
recommendation 4. One could also reasonably presume from
the HAC recommendations that payback utilization credit
could be measured more broadly—when the officer is assigned
to a position requiring his grade and the specialty his
graduate degree supports. This system would have been much
more manageable. One can only surmise as to why the
services did not capitalize on this opportunity because more
criticism was soon to come.
C. THE 1980 'S
The aforementioned criticism came in the form of a DOD,
Office of the Inspector General audit of the services
management of their graduate education programs. The audit
was conducted from June 1982 through April 1983. Its
^Manning factors were discontinued by the Army for
FY83. No differentiation by grade and specialty was used by
the Army up to the point of method discontinuance.
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purpose was "to determine whether the services' requirements
for and utilization of officers with graduate degrees
supported the amount of graduate education funded by the DOD
. .
." [Ref. 38 :p. i] . The general findings indicated that
for all services, 437 of 749 (58 percent) officers sampled
who had completed full-time graduate education in 1981 were
not assigned to first tour validated positions (as required
by DOD Directive 1322.10). The Army failed to assign 37 of
110 (34 percent) graduates to validated positions. No
records were available indicating approved deferrals for 30
of the 37^. [Ref. 38:p. 4] The 34 percent non-utilization
rate (i.e., 66 percent utilization rate) compares
unfavorably to previously Army reported rates as indicated
in Table 4-2. The reason for this discrepancy is not clear
except that the Army figures, 1975-1980, were manually
derived and, therefore, subject to error. The audit
figures, on the other hand, are the result of samples
individually investigated at the unit/installation level.
Other audit findings, not applicable to the scope of this
thesis, are as follows:
^Army utilization rates included only that percentage
of officers placed on MILPERCEN assignment orders to
validated positions—does not include data regarding the
percentage of officers who were actually utilized for a
three-year tour in validated positions. This data, as of
October 1986, is not available according to MILPERCEN


















Source: MILPERCEN files, 1981
- effectively and efficiently utilize officers who
received graduate education,
- include many officers who had graduate degrees in their
graduate education program requirements computations,
and
- maintain documented justifications to support many
positions recorded as validated in their mechanized man-
power data systems. [Ref. 38 :p. i]
It should be noted that the audit recognized the potential
of CSMIS in improving the Army's management of its graduate
education system.
The adverse findings of the DOD IG audit resulted in a
reduction of $13,293 Million for all services' graduate
education programs in the DOD Appropriation Bill, 1986. The
Army was "penalized" $4,708 Million. The Senate
"^As stated in Chapter III, the MILPERCEN level deferral
process was significantly tightened in 1983 and this fact
was noted in the Army reply to the audit.
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Appropriations Committee justified the reductions by
stating:
A recent Defense Inspector General report cited
serious problems with the way professional education
requirements are determined. It also questioned whether
the services effectively use officers who receive Govern-
ment funded graduate education. The report had different
criticisms for each of the services, but noted abuses by
each.
The Committee is concerned the validation of require-
ments has not been carefully assessed by each service and
that those trained are not being utilized properly.
Considering the large sums of money which are expended
annually and the questions raised by the Inspector
General, the Committee believes a reduction is appropriate
in fiscal year 1986 for the operating funds which support
professional education programs. The Committee expects
the Defense Department to review its professional educa-
tion policies in view of the criticism expressed by the
inspector general. [Ref. 39 :p, 45]
The Army shortfall of this magnitude, according to the
MILPERCEN program budget manager in December 1985, would
lead to a termination of new graduate schooling starts for
FY86 and jeopardize continued funding for the previous year
(FY85) starts. Army leadership was able to internally
obtain the required funding to continue previous and
programmed new starts for FY86.
The findings of the DOD IG Audit were not an anomaly.
Research of historical utilization rates of Army officer
graduates of the Florida Institute of Technology (FIT)
indicate similar low utilization rates. Between 1975 and
1979, only 40.9 percent of master's level graduates of the
Contract and Acquisition Management were assigned to any
contract/acquisition positions. [Ref. 40:pp. 13-14] The
87
above data does not pertain to assignments to AERB-
validated positions. If it did, the utilization rates would
be even lower as the procurement/contract validated
positions are a subset of all such positions.
The Army (and the other seirvices, as well) preferred to
report utilization rates in terms of centralized assignments
to organizations with validated positions, as indicated in
Table 4-2 vice the more accurate measurement of actual
occupation rates in validated positions. The DOD IG Audit
and the Dopson and Jaggers study indicates that actual
utilization (which the DOD directive mandates) was lower
than the Army was reporting.
Congressional action on the FY86 DOD budget, based on
the DOD IG Audit indicates that legislators are prepared to
turn the screw in order to force the services to improve
management of their graduate education programs.
The final applicable review of officer graduate
education to be considered is the Professional Development
of Officers Study (PDOS)^, often referred to as the Bagnal
Study in reference to its director, LTG Charles W. Bagnal.
The study was commissioned in May 1984 by the Chief of Staff
of the Army:
to reexamine all aspects of the officer's professional
development system as it has evolved since the 1978 Review
of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study, and
to project the applicability of that system and our recom-
mendations out to the year 2025. [Ref. 4:p. 1]
8The author was a member of this study.
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The study looked into all aspects of officer profession-
al development including the Army Graduate Education System.
This study found several major shortcomings with the
identification of requirements. First, the process (AERB)
is faulty in that it does not meet its objective of
identifying total requirements. Determination of need
solely by a position-by-position review cannot identify all
requirements at the master's degree level. Second, incon-
sistencies exist. Some organizations have large numbers of
validations, others don't have any. Likewise, some
organizations which have had many validations approved by
one board will not submit for revalidation for the next
board. And there are organizations with positions of equal
or near equal task difficulty and significance in which only
some of the positions are submitted for validation. These
inconsistencies can generally be traced to the philosophy of
the commander/director and/or the position incumbent; the
reluctance of unit personnel managers to submit positions
for validation because of the special management
requirements for validated positions; and the reality that
the AERB is a reactive process—only positions authorized on
TAADS are eligible for validation consideration and specific
future requirements cannot be identified. [Ref. 4: pp. S-1
to S-5-2]
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Third, recognition of the general cognitive benefits of
graduate level education are not considered in the
validation process.
Finally, PDOS found that graduate education goals must
be reestablished. The last published goal was in 1972 for
2 percent of the officer corps to have graduate degrees.
By 1984, 28 percent had advanced degrees (OPMD managed
officers only, 01-06). [Ref. 4:pp. S-2-1 to S-6-1]
Based on the above findings, PDOS made the following
corrective recommendations^: [Ref. 4: pp. S-1-1 to S-6-1]
(1) Identify requirements based on organization, echelon,
mission and impact of work; and individual positions.
Assign obligated assets to validated organizations
for utilization payback.
(2) Identify future requirements with assistance from
MACOM's, the Army Science Board and the Army Research
Institute.
(3) Establish annual graduate education goals by special-
ties and grades. (Ibid, pp. S-1-1 to S-6-1.)
D. CONCLUSIONS
Two common threads of criticism pervade the numerous
military and Congressional reviews of the Army's Graduate
Education System. These are the process by which the Army
identifies and justifies the need for offices with graduate
education and the utilization of officers with graduate
degrees obtained through full-time schooling programs. Is
the problem that the Army disregards or disdains
^Other findings and recommendations were made, but are
outside the scope of this thesis.
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Congressional concern? Of course not. Or, does the Ammy
scorn the findings and recommendations of its own
commissioned reviews? Again, no. Perhaps the crux of the
problem, for the Army, is program mismanagement. Or perhaps
the problem is an incongruity between the underlying
philosophy of how requirements are identified and how
officers are utilized within the Army's system for
developing and managing its officer corps, as a group and
individually.
Considering the first issue, mismanagement, MILPERCEN
has implemented the CSMIS and tightened obligated asset
assign-ment procedures. Both have significantly improved
managerial capability although continual improvements are
needed. Furthermore, MILPERCEN is composed of the brightest
and best officers in the Army. Its officers have a record
of outstanding managerial leadership and technical
abilities. Assignment there involves a stringent nominative
process. The AGES is managed as well as can be expected
—
within the constraints of how officers are managed,
developed and utilized within OPMS . Therefore this is not
the problem. The problem is one of outdated policies being
applied to a new environment. The position-by-position
validation process coupled with a narrow definition of
utilization as contained in the DOD Directive is too
constricting for the way Army officers are developed,
managed and utilized. Current DOD policies recognize only
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the specific functional benefits of graduate education when
there are significant cognitive benefits to be gained as
well. Many benefits of graduate education, regardless of
the discipline of study, have universal application
throughout the Army to include non-validated positions. It
is important to understand that current DOD graduate
education policies were published in 1974 and were based on
an environment and concepts of the 1960 's and early 1970 's
—
a time when master's degrees were held by a small minority
within the civilian community; and graduate education was
less universally recognized by the officers corps as
necessary to perform well (see PDOS Survey results, Appendix
C).
To further elucidate, the general problem stated above,
the following sub-issues are discussed.
1. System Management
MILPERCEN is responsible for macro personnel manage-
ment. It manages manpower resources. It assigns officers
to field commands and installations. It is at these lower
echelons where micro personnel management occurs—the
assignment of officers to individual positions and the
transfer of officers to other individual positions within
the command or installation at the discretion of the local
commander. Intra-command/installation personnel transfers
have traditionally been and strongly remain the prerogative
of the local commander. This is because no one but the
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local commander is in a better position to determine where
and how best to use his personnel resources. He has never
had to request permission regarding the decisions he makes.
Traditionally, he operates with a great deal of autonomy—
a
necessity in order to implement and enforce the age-old
adage, "the commander is responsible for everything his
people do or fail to do." If authority is shared (for
example, MILPERCEN approval of his intracommand personnel
decisions) , then so, too, must be the responsibility for the
successes or failures of his organization. No echelon above
that of the responsible commander is willing to assume this.
In short, in order to effect AERB utilization, MILPERCEN is
tasked to perform micro personnel management at a macro
management level; and field commanders are tasked to





Because of the reactive nature of the validation
process, no capability exists to accommodate position
changes or readjustment of the local commanders' need. Or
to forecast and proactively anticipate future educational
needs of new technologies.
3 Officer Reassiqnments
Officers rarely spend three years in the same posi-
tion. Those that do often are astigmatized as being a
person of lower caliber abilities—no one else wants him.
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Therefore, officers during a three year tour will hold at
least two jobs, often three. Job rotation enhances one's
professional development through exposure to a variety of




A position-by-position identification process can
never identify total requirements. It requires a "yes" or
"no" answer based on a combination of a brief job descrip-
tion and justification (the request for validation) and the
judgment and opinion of board members. (Note: Not all
board members viewed and voted on each request during the
1983 AERB.) If a position-by-position validation process
identified total Army requirements, the number of validated
positions would be commensurate with the number of officers
who feel graduate education is necessary for proficiency in
one of their specialties— 66.5 percent (see Appendix C) .
This would equate to about 60,000 validated positions.
5 Submission of Request Is Major Predictor for
Validation
The predictor for determining whether a position
will be validated is the submission of a request for valida-
tion—a .97 validation rate (Army Educational Requirements
Board Proceedings, 1983). A bias exists to validate--a fact
recognized by Congressional hearings.
6 Inconsistent Validations
Some positions are validated which should not be.
Likewise, there are positions worthy of validation but are
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not (generally because no request for validation was
submitted.) The former situation exists because of the
approval bias of the board. The latter exists, in part,
because of the "nominative assignment" process available to
certain organizations. Higher echelon organizations, like
HQDA, have the right to select and reject officers for
assignment to the organization. Usually criteria for
selection are based on an officer's previous manner of
performance and civilian and military education levels. If
one of those criteria is a master's degree, MILPERCEN makes
the necessary assignment regardless of whether the officer
is an obligated asset or the position is validated. When
higher headquarters beckons, subordinates obey. For this
reason, there is a tendency for higher echelon
organizations, especially those who enjoy nominative
assignment authority to not need to work within the
validation process. Additionally, other inconsistencies
exist. For example, approximately 1800 ROTC instructor
positions exist (grades 03-06) where the college or
university requires military instructors to have at least a
master's degree. These requirements are neither validated
nor accounted for in the annual full-time schooling quota
development. Often the meeting of a ROTC instructor
assignment causes a validated position to not be filled.





Validated positions within the organization require
field personnel managers to submit special personnel
requisitions and then ensure that available obligated assets
occupy these positions—or be prepared to defend why not
during inspections (use of obligated assets and validated
position management are items of inspector general—IG
interest and, therefore, inspected). For some commanders, -^^
having validated positions is not worth the effort or
trouble.
8 Multiple Criteria
Graduate education is not the only criterion on
which officers are assigned and utilized. There are
specific considerations given to one's specialties, grade,
experience, professional development needs and military
education level. To design a system to meet graduate
education criterion only, at the expense of any or all of
the other criteria, could not only damage the operation of
the Army, but the individual officer's career, as well.
9 Historical Inconsistencies
As stated previously, validations within some
organizations are inconsistent from one board to the next,
depending usually upon the interest of the unit's commander.
This problem was identified in 1984 by the Commanding
General, Army Material Command (AMC) . Of course, this
-'-^Author interviews.
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inconsistency causes tremendous continuity problems for
MILPERCEN managers, especially with regard to inventory
development.
10. Timing
Once a position is validated, it can take upwards of
three years to receive an asset, especially for the doctoral
level. Three years provides time for identifying an officer
for schooling, school acceptance and schooling. Further-
more, commanders are reluctant to move incumbents, who do
not possess the graduate education prerequisites, out of
validated positions. Graduate education is not an exclusive
guarantor of success. Often the "unqualified" incumbent is
handling the position duties exceedingly well and was doing
so prior to the position's validation. ' Vacancy timing can
cause considerable problems for MILPERCEN managers. Often
appropriate assignments for obligated assets cannot be
found. This causes excessive deferrals.
11
.
Translation of Requirements Into Annual Quotas
Hand-in-hand with the validation and utilization
processes is the translation of requirements into an appro-
priate inventory of officers with the right mix of grades,
specialties and disciplines to be utilized against the
requirements. As discussed in Chapter III, the Army uses
utilization rates between .40 and .85 in computing the
inventory size per specialty.-'--'- A utilization rate of .50
-'--'-Future Army Requirements (FAR) model.
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means there will be two officers per position, or,
conversely, one officer will serve half the time in a
particular position (serve half his assignments in one of
his specialties—or, more specifically, half his assignments
in a validated position for his specialty and grade) . A
utilization rate of 1.00 would mean developing one officer
per validated position. If captains were developed at or
near a utilization rate of 1.00, initial utilization at the
grades of captain and major would be assured. The tradeoff,
unfortunately, would be a disastrous shortfall in the
inventory, once it has aged, to meet lieutenant colonel and
colonel validated requirements. This shortfall would
eventually affect the general officer inventory. The
alternatives, therefore, available to MILPERCEN managers are
to either develop the number of captains to continuously
meet captain and major validations and thus satisfy critics;
or develop an inventory of captains which, as it ages, will
perhaps over-prescribe at the junior grades but, more impor-
tantly, they will just meet senior grade demands. This is
the dichotomy the Army faces today: Meet DOD directive
policies or do what is right for the Army.
12 . Functional Orientation
The current AGES is based solely on individual
position functional requirements. No recognition is given
to the overall cognitive benefits of graduate education—the
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ability to think, plan, develop alternatives, solve problems
and make the best decisions.
Considering recent Congressional budget slashing of
graduate education monies due to what legislators consider
program abuses, a change must be made to the philosophical
basis of officer graduate education— its purpose and
benefits. The next chapter considers several alternatives.
99
V. CRITERIA AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this thesis is to not only identify Army
Graduate Education System (AGES) shortcomings but more
importantly to establish an appropriate alternative to the
current system. It has been determined that the Army must
continue to rely on civilian graduate education in order to
deal with the complexities of a modern technological
environment. Since 1970 internal and external reviews of
DOD graduate policies and practices have found numerous
shortcomings (Chapter IV) . Since 1971 the Congress has
reduced the services' graduate schooling budgets on three
occasions claiming program mismanagement. In 1978, the
House Appropriations Committee, presumably recognizing that
mismanagement was not the issue, recommended a
Review of the validation process . . . consideration
should be given to replacement of the validation process
with a system of specific educational objectives for
officers of like career designations which is divorced
from the artificial degree requirement currently in use.
[Ref. 36:p. 29]
Although the issue was opened to change the current system,
DOD did not capitalize on this opportunity, instead hoping
to improve the existing system.
Before one can determine what changes to make, it is
necessary to first establish criteria against which a new
system must be measured.
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A. CRITERIA
The following criteria were developed based on the
shortcomings of the current AGES, and the professional
development needs of the officer corps. Army graduate
education programs must perfoirm the following functions.
1. Contribute to the Overall Educational Level of the
Officer Corps and the Professional Development of
the Individual Officer
Army officers are professionally developed through
the following means-^: Military schooling, military experi-
ence, self-study/development, and civil schooling. The
failure to capitalize on any of these four cornerstones, is
detrimental to the individual officer and the Army as a
whole. Furthermore, graduate education programs, especially
those which are full-time, must benefit the officer
throughout his career. In other words, graduate degrees are
not merely to prepare one for a follow-on assignment.
2
.
Recognize that a Master's Degree Level Education is
a Requisite for Certain Grades and Specialties
The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) proponent (FA48)
believes that a graduate degree in a FAO oriented academic
discipline is required in order to be a fully qualified FAO.
Likewise, Engineer Corps officers need graduate education in
engineering disciplines in order to reach their fullest
potential
.
^Mentoring should be a foundation of professional
development (according to the Professional Development of




Balance Cocrnitive and Functional Needs
Current Army validation practices emphasize func-
tional requirements. No position was validated by the 1983
AERB based on a position's cognitive demands—total emphasis
was on needed skills within a certain specialty. No regard
is given under the current system for the development of
both "cognitive equipment"—skills, knowledge, values, etc.,
which are functionally oriented; and "cognitive power" which
is the innate mental force one possesses—the potential of
which can be theoretically maximized through vigorous
educational experiences^
.
4 Identify Future Graduate Education Requirements
This is a criterion in which the AERB falls grossly
short. The AERB can only react to existing needs. If the
need is unique, as for a new high tech discipline, it can
take upwards of three years to produce a qualified officer.
For example, in the early 1980 's the Army severely lacked
qualified military personnel in the artificial intelligence
field. A method to proactively anticipate requirements is a
necessity.
5 Identify Total Requirements and Educate Officers
Within Current Manpower and Budget Levels
Although an explicit goal of the AERB process is to
identify total Army graduate education requirements,
^Interviews with Elliott Jacques, T.O. Jacobs, Major
Larry Boyce and Jim McGuire, Army Research Institute,
Alexandria, Virginia; October 3, 1986.
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sufficient evidence exists showing that a position-by-
position validation process cannot and has not sufficiently
identified the Army's entire need. If the total Army
requirement was established it would probably be in the
neighborhood of 70-80-^ percent of the officer corps needing
graduate education vice the current level of about 50
percent. Meeting this increased demand cannot be met by
significantly increasing inputs to full-time program levels.
This is especially true considering Gramm-Rudman constraints
and the Army's goal of manning two additional divisions
within current manpower levels. A strategy must be
developed which is
most efficient (maximizes the attainment of the objective
with the given resources) or economical (minimizes the
cost of achieving the objective) —the strategy which is
most efficient also being the most economical. [Ref.
41:p. 3]
The alternatives, therefore, must lie in off-duty
degree sources—Tuition Assistance Program, Cooperative
Degree Programs (COOP) , etc. The scope of this thesis does
not permit a thorough discussion of these alternatives,
except to say that alternatives to full-time programs must
be pursued.
6 . Reduce Administrative and Managerial Costs
The current AGES is noted for its tremendous
administrative and management costs associated with the
-^See Professional Development of Officers (PDOS)
Survey results. Appendix C.
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validation of individual positions via the AERB and then the
extraordinary management requirements at MILPERCEN and the
local levels. The identification of requirements and system
management must be streamlined.
7
.
Recognizes the Autonomy of Installations and
Subordinate Commanders
This recognition would allow them to make appropri-
ate personnel decisions applicable to all their officers to
include those having just completed a full-time graduate
program. The failures of the current system to operate
within this criteria is well documented, and a major cause
for shortfalls is utilization rates of obligated assets. In
short, this criterion states that those in the best position
to make micro personnel decisions (assignment of officers to
individual positions) be left to those most capable of doing
so—the field commanders.
8 Operate Within Political Limits
Considering the myriad of Congressional and 0MB cri-
ticism of the 1970 's and as recent as 1985 directed at the
AGES (and the other services' programs, as well), neither
current DOD policies on funded programs nor the services'
execution thereof, remain politically feasible or advisable.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
An analysis of the shortcomings of the current AGES
leads one to two universally deficient aspects of the
system. These are the process by which requirements are
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identified; and the constraints under which utilization is
narrowly measured not being in the best interest of the Army
or the individual. Recommended changes are as follows:
1. Requirements Identification
In order to identify the Army's total requirements,
a two-dimensional process vice the current one-dimensional
one is necessary. These dimensions include the following
factors.
a. Establish Specific Graduate Education Goals
Proponents should set master's and doctoral
goals by specialty and grade (captain through colonel, OPMD
managed officers) . Army proponents are the most knowledge-
able agencies of officer professional development needs.
Each proponent's input should be staffed through the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) , MILPERCEN, and
Director of Training (DOT-ODCSOPS) . Proponents' input may
include specific academic discipline and/or master's and
doctoral requirements necessary to meet any organization's
extraordinary or special needs. Because of the narrow
nature of doctoral level education, the bulk of these
requirements may be best individually stated. The DCSPER
will be the approving authority.
b. Establish a HQDA Graduate Education Board
This board will be under the auspices of the
DCSPER. It will be composed of select civilian and military
educators (U.S. Military Academy/Army War College/Army
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Command and General Staff College/TRADOC) representing the
humanities, business/management, engineering, physical
sciences, and social fields of study. It should also
include representatives from the civilian business,
managerial and science community (i.e., corporation CEO's,
Rand Corporation executives, etc.). Finally, the board
should include military experts who can address Army and
Defense doctrinal requirements (current and future) . The
purpose of the Graduate Education Board will be to advise
the DCSPER of the future civilian education needs of the
Army—developments in the civilian and military communities
which will have a bearing, near and far term, upon the Army.
The board should establish macro and micro plans and
strategies regarding officer graduate education. The board
should meet annually to review the status of or need to
adjust established plans and strategies. This board's
recommendations should be reported to the CSA for approval
.
2 . Utilization
As previously stated, requirements validation and
utilization of officers are not independent. Therefore,
changes in one must have a corresponding and amenable change
in the other. Utilization policies should be changed as
follows.
a. MILPERCEN Make Assignments to Organizations
Officers with graduate degrees fall within two
categories: Those whose academic discipline of study
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supports one or both of their specialties^; and those whose
discipline supports neither. Officers with degrees that
support their specialt (ies) possess the greatest utility
potential for the Army and the organizations to which they
are assigned. These individuals should be assigned by
MILPERCEN to organizations with the greatest priority.
Priority should be based on the organization's mission,
echelon, and impact of decisions made by the organization
upon the Army, as a whole. For example, the staff work of a
major working in the Office of the Comptroller, HQDA leads
to decisions of more import and impact than does the staff
work of a major in an installation comptroller position.
The impact of decisions made at HQDA have the potential for
Army-wide affect; decisions at the installation level rarely
impact beyond its gates.
The A2rmy has a system in operation which could
be adopted to identify a priority of need by organization.
The system is the Officer Distribution Plan (ODP) . The ODP
is MILPERCEN 's means to equitably distribute the officer
corps, by specialty and grade, within an environment where
officer authorizations (i.e., positions) exceed
Congressionally set officer inventory limits. Based on the
aforementioned criteria (echelon, impact of work, etc.), a
level of fill is established for each Army organization.
Some are at "100 percent ODP"; others 90 percent, 80
'^Often called "usable" degrees
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percent, and so on. A similar distribution plan should be
used for distributing officers with "usable" graduate
degrees. The category of officers with non-supportive
graduate degrees should be distributed as any other officer.
The distribution of officers with "usable"
degrees by a special distribution plan may give the
appearance of "have" and "have not" Army organizations.
Under this system, the disparity should be no greater than
that which results from the current ODP process.
Furthermore, officers with usable degrees will not spend
their entire careers in higher priority organizations (like
HQDA) . They will continue to alternate assignments in their
two specialties, one of which may not be directly supported
by their degree; and officers will continue to need a
variety of experiences as part of their professional
development—experiences perhaps in organizations with a
lower ODP--battalions, brigades, divisions, corps, schools
(as instructors), etc.
b. Field Commanders Make Assignments to Individual
Positions
Local commanders, who are in the best position
to make individual duty assignments, would assign their
officers to duties where the units' need is greatest—to
positions appropriate for the individual's grade and
specialties; and to duties best for the individual. This
would allow a negotiation process to exist between the
officer and his commander or supervisor. Under the present
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AGES, neither the commander, supervisor or individual on an
AERB utilization tour can negotiate position.^ It may be
noted that officers not on utilization tours can and do




The following recommendations fall outside the
specific scope of this thesis, however, they are worthy
either of adoption or further study. These include the
following factors.
(1) Adjust FAR Utilization Rates . Currently
MILPERCEN uses utilization rates by grade between .5-. 85.^
Consideration should be given to adjusting these rates to
correspond to historical rates by grade and specific
specialty. Some branches and functional areas are over and
under subscribed (engineer branch is traditionally undersub-
scribed—too few in the inventory) . This adjustment could
produce a more accurate inventory size.
(2) Establish Better Communication Between
Congress and POD Regarding Officer Graduate Education .
Since 1971, a common thread of criticism has been that
because of an inflated validation process, requirements are
^Except that the commander can request from MILPERCEN
authority to defer an officer being placed in an AERB
validated position.
^See Chapter III and Appendix I for explanation of the
FAR model use in establishing annual master's degree full-
time inputs.
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over-stated. However, evidence exists to the contrary."^
The aforementioned recommendations will increase graduate
education requirements substantially. However, this does
not mean the Army must make a corresponding increase to
annual full-time schooling inputs. Studies must be
conducted to determine the right number of full-time inputs
considering alternative competing demands for personnel and
money—the operational account must be manned and funded,
too. Not every graduate education requirement ("goal,"
under this new system) can be met through full-time
programs
.
(3) Provide More Opportunities for Off-Duty
Graduate Education . The following are potential ideas for
expanding graduate education opportunities.
• Establish a mechanism whereby more graduate credits can
be transferred from one university to another--this
would require some method of mutual recognition.
• Coordinate with universities to establish more extension
schools with a greater variety of discipline on or
adjacent to military installations.
• Coordinate with local universities the establishment of
work-study graduate programs like the one started at Ft.
Leavenworth in cooperation with the University of
Kansas. Permanent party staff members are able to
acquire graduate degrees in operations research/systems
analysis tailored to their duty requirements. Written
projects have military application, often to their duty
assignment. Classes meet during off and on-duty hours.
During a three year tour one can acquire a master of
science. Similar programs could be established at Ft.
Huachuca for intelligence and signal officers in
conjunction with the University of Arizona, Contacts
with university officials reveal a willingness to
7See PDOS Officer Survey results. Appendix C.
110
establish programs in disciplines which support signal
and intelligence duties.^
C. SUMMARY
The recommended aforementined changes to AGES represent
more than just a change. Perhaps "overhaul" would be a
better term. But overhaul is what is needed. These recom-
mendations would correct current system deficiencies, meet
each of the established criteria, including political
feasibility. In 1978, the House Appropriations Committee
recommended changes to DOD policy which are not dissimilar
from the recommendations contained herein.
^Information acquired by this officer during conversa-
tions with university officials in September 1984.
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APPENDIX A
TRANSIT, HOLDING AND STUDENT (THS) DATA. US ARMY
(END OF MONTH AVERAGE SEP8 3-AUG8 4)
T H S Total
01/02 2886 681 1461 5028
03 1244 32 3544 4820
04 476 13 1012 1501
05 237 20 283 540
06 75 15 87 177
TOTAL 4918 761 6387 12066
Source: MILPERCEN files, 1984
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APPENDIX B
THE MATHEMATICAL PROCEDURE KNOWN AS T.O.P.S.I.S.
The Technique For Order Preference by Similarity to
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) was developed in the late 1970 's at
Kansas State University. It is based upon the concept that
the most desirable alternative of any given set of alterna-
tives should be closest to the ideal solution and farthest
from the worst-case or negative ideal solution.
TOPSIS is an appropriate rank ordering method when some
N number of attributes (criteria) are used to evaluate some
M number of alternatives. Weights are applied to the
attributes as they will normally not have equal emphasis in
the mind of the decision maker.
TOPSIS is far more robust than most other mathematical
methods which allow weighting of the criteria against the
alternative. The best known, simple weighted averaging,
does not examine the relative strength of an alternative in
two directions, i.e., both the negative ideal and positive
ideal vectors.
TOPSIS assumes that each attribute can be described by a
monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing utility
curve. Increasing would be used for a beneficial attribute
and decreasing for a cost attribute. A decision maker's
preference (the utility) can be described as increasing as
the value of the attribute increases. An example would be
crash worthiness in an automobile. As the crash worthiness
increases, so does the preference ofthe decision maker for
an alternative possessing that attribute.
The attributes inevitably represent opposing functions.
More crash worthiness can be bought for a higher price.
Price would be the decreasing or cost function. As price
decreases, the preference of the decision maker increases.
The TOPSIS assumption of monotonic increasing or
decreasing functions is practical. Most applications
concerning cost, speed, safety, consistency, reliability,
etc.
,
are congruous with the assumption. Non-monotonic
functinos are rare and would describe attributes whose
greatest utility occurs at some value between the positive
or negative ideal rather than approaching some realistic
limit. Examples would be the best number of children to
have, the most comfortable temperature in a room, or the
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right amount of rainfall. More is not necessarily better as
neither is less necessarily worse.
Euclidean distance is used to measure the actual
numerical distance of a specific alternative to the ideal
solution and negative ideal solution. With N attributes,
this measure is calculated in N space. For example, with 3
attributes: the Euclidean distance between two points in
"three-space" is:
D = \/(X2 - Xi)2 + (Y2 - Yi)2 + (Z2 - Z^) 2
Matrix mathematics as shown in the following steps, eases
the process of both the weighting and the distance
calculations.




Al ^11 ^12 •• Xij • • • ^In
A2 ^21 ^22 •• . X2j • • • ^2n
D =
Aj_ X-L2 ^i2 • • ^ij • • • ^in
^m ^ml ^m2 • • • ^mj • • • ^mn
where
A^ = the i^^ alternative
X^j = the numerical value awarded the i"*-^ alterna-
tive with respect only to the j"*-^ criterion
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TOPSIS can be understood in six logical steps.
STEP 1. Construct the Normalized Decision Matrix.
This step transforms the various attribute dimensions
into a non-dimensional entity, i.e., a vector of unit
length. This allows more valid comparisons between attri-
butes. One way to accomplish this is to divide each value
by the sum of squares of the values for that attribute.
^iJ = ^ij/
STEP 2. Construct the Weighted Normalized Decision Matrix
This matrix combines the decision maker's weights as
derived from Annex P, into the normalized decision matrix.
The computation of this matrix V, is shown below.
^11 ^12 ••• ^Ij ••• ^m "^1^11 "^2^12 ••• "'j'^ij ••• ""n^ln
w.r . . ... w„r,V v^3_ V.2 ... V ... v^ = w^r.^ w^r.^ ... . ^.^
^ml "ua % •• ^mn Vl^ "2'^m2 ••• "j'^mj ••• Vn«
STEP 3 . Determine the Ideal and Negative Ideal Solutions
Let A* be an artificial alternative whose attribute
scores are made up of the highest values awarded any
alternative.
Likewise, let A~ be an artificial alternative whose
attribute scores are made up of the lowest values awarded
any alternative.
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A* = ( (max v-LJ I j -: J) , (min v-i_j | j - J • ) | i = 1, 2 , . . . ,m)
i i
= {Vi,V2, . .
.
,Vj , . .
.
,v^}
A = ( (min v-j_ j I j -: J) , (max Vj_j |j ^-J')|i = 1,2, ...,m}




where J = {j = l,2,...,n|j associated with benefit criteria}
J' = {j = l,2,...,n|j associated with cost criteria}
Then it is certain that the two created alternatives A and
A~ indicate the most prefereable (ideal solution) and the




The A* artificial alternative represents the positive
ideal solution (most preferred) but does not actually exist.
The A~ alternative represents the least preferred solution
and also does not actually exist.
STEP 4. Calculate the Separation Measures
The distance between the alternatives can now be
measured in Euclidean distance as previously discussed.
The distance between each alternative and positive ideal
is given by:
2
'i* = \ I (Vij - Vj)-^ , i = 1,2,
V j = i
m
The distance between each alternative and the negative ideal
is given by:
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Si- = y I (Vij - Vj)2 , i = 1,2, ...,m
STEP 5. Calculate Relative Closeness to the Ideal Solution
The relative closeness of any alternative Aj_ to A is
defined as:
Ci* = Sj__/(Si* + S-i__) , < Ci* < 1 , i = 1,2, ...,m
STEP 6. Rank the Alternatives in Preference Order
The alternatives can now be rank ordered. The preferred
solution is the one with the largest TOPSIS score.













2. Primary intent in obtaining graduate degree.
ACS Respondents All Respondents
Serve more effectively 28.1% 22.2%
Enhance professional
intellectual growth 33.9 32.9
More competitive for
selection boards 22.8 19.7
Obtain a good civilian
j Ob 7.8 5.5
Does/did the opportunity to acquire ACS while on active
duty influence your decision to remain?
ACS Respondents All Respondents
Influences 59.4% 59.7%
Would stay anyway 3 8.4 3 5.8
Plan to separate 2.2 4.5
Officers need ACS even
if the Army does not
fund
ACS Respondents All Respondents
Agree 79.4% 70.0%
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5. Satisfaction with current duty position











for proficiency in one of my





Source: [Ref. 4:p. S-6-1]
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APPENDIX D
CRITERIA FOR VALIDATION OF MILITARY POSITIONS
REOUIRING ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICER PERSONNEL
WITH GRADUATE LEVEL EDUCATION
Positions in which the primary duties of the incumbents
cannot be optimally performed except by individuals
possessing qualifications that normally can be acquired
only through graduate level education in a relevant
field of study. These positions are predominantly those
in which there is a direct relationship among the
primary duty to be performed, the relevant educational
field, the individual's occupational specialty or sub-
specialty, and the organizational function to be
performed. Examples are positions requiring assignment
of qualified physical, biological, and social scien-
tists, engineers, designers, analysts, teachers,
writers, counselors and statisticians.
Positions which must be filled by individuals who are
required to exert direct technical supervision over
military and/or civilian personnel who are required to
possess graduate level education. These positions are
exclusively supervisory and assistant supervisory in
nature. There must be a general relationship among the
positions, the educational field, and type of organiza-
tion. Although positions will tend primarily to be in
the field grades, some may be in lower grades. Gener-
ally, however, level and type of organization supervised
will be of more significance than the position's grade.
Examples are chiefs of laboratories, detachments, sec-
tions, branches, divisions, departments and similar
organizations of a technical, analytical, developmental,
research or instructional nature.
Positions which, for optimum effectiveness, must be
filled by individuals who possess knowledge of a
specific field of study to permit effective staff
planning, coordination, and command advisory functions.
Such knowledge would include the capability to
comprehend theories, principles, terminology, processes
and techniques which are necessary for effective
appraisal and evaluation of complex programs.




The following validation criteria are merely guidance
which can be considered in evaluating a position's valida-
tion worthiness. It is not a substitute for the panel
member's common sense, good judgment, and experience.
1. Is the training required available in the DOD or
Army School system?
2. Characteristics of a position which require an
incumbent with an advanced civilian education
degree:
a. High degree of responsibility.
b. Accomplishment of complex/technical tasks.
c. Echelon and impact.
3. Education at the graduate level results in:
a. Increased depth of understanding, insight and
knowledge in a field usually more specific and
narrow than at the baccalaureate level.
b. Additional understanding, insight and knowl-
edge in supporting, related, or peripheral
fields.
c. A greater host of skills which allow the
accomplishment of more complex tasks.
4. Types of education at the graduate level:
a. Philosophical/analytical/technical
.
b. Augments materiel/leadership development.
c. Develops entry level skills.
5. Advanced civilian education can be a substitute for
experience.




(1) By law, i.e., polygraph examiners.
(2) Additional understanding, insight and
knowledge in a technical area.
Graduate degrees: Based on high level of
technical expertise—not for materiel
(leadership) type duties.
Source: MILPERCEN files, 1982
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APPENDIX F
CIVIL EDUCATION FOR OFFICER PERSONN
MTTT
AT"TiVILIAN INSTITUTIONS, 15 OCTOBER 1986
(Extracted from Table 1, DA Circular 621-84-1
Table 1 Academic disciplines by oMicer specially*
Acacemic
ai5cioiine




8AL Operations research systems
analysis lORSA)— Business (or
OflSA related discipline)
8MS Advanced militarv studies (or mili-
tar/ arts i science)
CHJ Command, control and communi-
cations (C3)
CUB Operations research systems
analysis (weapons effects)
cue Operations research systems
analysis (ORSA)— engineering (or
ORSA related discipline)





















analysis (ORSA)— business (or
ORSA related discipline)
Advanced military studies (or mili-
tary arts i science)
Electronic engineering









Psychology (or other psychology
related disciplines)
Operations research systems
analysis (ORSA)— business (or
ORSA related discipline)
Advanced military studies (or mili-
tary arts & science)
Electronic engineering
Command, control and communi-
cations (e3)






BAL Operations research systems
analysis (ORSA)— business (or
ORSA related discipline)
BMS Advanced militar/ studies (or mili-
tar/ arts i science)
CHJ Command, control and communi-
cations (C3)
CKX Mechanical engineering
CKP Guided missiles or rocketry
CUB Operations research systems
analysis (weapons effects)
* Exceoi'ons 'o aisciQiines iisied may oe aooroved oased on tne need
ol ine Army


















































BMS Advanced military studies (or mili-
tary arts & science)




























CHJ Command, control and communi-
cations iC3)
SC27
BAT-- Materiel acquisition management
B8R-- Systems management
Oiiicer must also oeoesiqnaied ASI 6T
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Cir 621-84-1
Table 1 Academic disciplines by oHicar specialty— Continued
Academic
discioiine
SoeciaitY code Oiscio'ine mie
Taoie 1 Academic disciplines ay oiticer specialty— Continued
Academic
discioiine






CHJ Commana. control and communi-
cations (C3)
CHX Electrical engineering
CUA Automatic data processing sys-
tem engineering (or related com-
puter science discipline)





















analysis— Dusiness (or any related
computer science discipline)
Automatic data processing sys-
tem—business (or related com-
puter science discipline)
Advanced military studies
Command, control and communi-
cations (C3)











CHJ Command, control and communi-
cations iC3)
CUA Automatic data processing sys-
tem engineering (or related com-
puter science discipline)
cue Operations research analysis— en-
gineering
CUD Computer science (artificial intelli-
gence)
OHA Statistics
BAO Organizational behavior— organi-
zational effectiveness
BAP Personnel management
BBS Personnel management adminis-
tration
BBR Systems management
BMS Advanced military studies





BSE Research program management





CHJ Joint command, control and com-
munications
CLX Nuclear engineering
CUA Automated data processing sys-
tems—engineering
cue Operations research systems
analysis— engineering










BAL Operations research systems
analysis— business
BAN Automatic data processing sys-
tem-business
BAP Personnel management
BBS Personnel management adminis-
tration
BBR Systems management
BMS Advanced military studies





BBN Hotel restaurant management
EFA Recreation
BAA Accounting and auditing
BAD Banking and financing
BAM ComptroilershiD







BAT" * Materiel acquisition management




** O'ficer must ai so oe designated A SI 6T
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Cir 621-84-1
Table 1 Acaaafnic disciplines by ollicer soecially— Continued
Academic
CiSCiOline
Soecialty coae Oiscioime liile





































SAL Operations research systems
analysis— business
BAT" Materiel acquisition management
B8R" Systems management
CUB Operations research systems
analysis (weapons effects)
cue Operations research systems
analysis—engineering
DHA Statistics
BAL Operations research system analy-
sis—business
BAT" Materiel acquisition management






CKP Guided missiles and rocketi7
CKX Mechanical engineering
cue Operations research systems
analysis— engineering










Nuclear engineering (or any re-
lated nuclear engineering disci-
pline!
Engineering, explosive





BAN Automatic data processing sys-
tem—business
BAT" Materiel acquisition management
BBR" Systems management
CUA Automatic data processing sys-
tem engineering
CUD Computer science (artificial intelli-
gence)
CYY Robotics
BPT Manpower, personnel and training
analysis
BMS Advanced military studies (or mili-
tary arts and science)
CHJ Command, control and communi-
cations (03)
CUB Operations research systems
analysis (weapons effects)































BAT" Materiel acquisition management
BBF Logistics management
BBP Procurement ana contract man-
agement
BBR" Systems management
" Officer mus I aiso De desrgnaiea ASi 6T ' Officer musi aiso oeaesiqnaied ASi 6T
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analysis (ORSA)— engineering or
any related ORSA discipline)
Analytical chemistry
Chemistry lor any related chemis-
try discipline)







BAN Automatic data processing sys-
tem—business







Maintenance engineering (or any
maintenance related discipline)
Operations research systems
analysis (ORSA)— engineering (or
any related ORSA discipline)
Industrial engineering
Robotics
Automatic data processing sys-









Table 1 Academic disciplines by officer specially— Continued
Acaaemic
discioiine





8BG Transportation and transport man-
agement
cue Operations research systems
analysis—engineering (or any re-
lated ORSA)
SC97
BAT- - Materiel acquisition management
BAX Business administration (or any
business related discipline)
BBK Industrial management
BBP Procurement and contract man-
agement
BBR-- Systems management






RECOMMENDED VALIDATIONS BY SPECIALTY AND GRADE
03 04 05 06 TOTAL
11 2 11 8 2 23
12 2 7 12 21
13 4 5 11 3 23
14 2 20 10 1 33
15 4 15 15 3 37
21 127 97 136 140 500
22 6 9 10 4 29
25 14 22 15 8 59
27 39 54 38 11 142
31 18 38 27 9 92
35 4 27 12 4 47
36 1 1 2
37 2 16 6 2 26
40 10 6 16
41 9 38 45 35 127
42 5 5 7 8 25
43 10 13 13 5 41
44 9 73 73 13 168
45 41 98 166 63 368
46 12 69 55 28 164
48 24 245 226 151 646
49 98 224 122 21 465
51 28 47 59 64 198
52 11 39 32 11 93
53 42 101 55 39 237
54 7 14 13 30 64
55 1 10 7 18
56 17 86 63 9 175
70 44 44
71 3 7 14 15 39
72 2 3 5 10 20
73 7 2 8 3 20
74 16 13 18 3 50
75 10 4 9 5 28
81 2 11 10 6 29
82 34 17 5 56
91 3 13 17 15 48
92 3 15 20 13 51
95 6 11 14 12 43
97 47 44 48 54 193
637 1542 1427 855 4461
Source: Army Educat,. Req. Board Proceed. 1983, p). End.
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APPENDIX H
SHORTAGE ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES, FY 1982
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
Area Studies
Operations Research Analyst (ENGR)
Civil Engineering

































































Source: MILPERCEN files, 1981
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APPENDIX I
EXAMPLE OF FAR MODEL FOR FA 53, ADP MANAGEMENT,
FYS 3 MASTER'S LEVEL QUOTA PLAN DEVELOPMENT
STEP 1: Determine the upper and lower limits of the inven-
tory keying on majors using a utilization rate
range .50-. 85-'-; and actual continuation rates for
















STEP 2: Same as above, but key on lieutenant colonels.
161 = X 1.38 59 .50 = 118 2.37 = 50
94 X 1.38 59 .85 = 69 2.37 = 29
STEP 3: Same as steps 1 and 2, but key on colonels.
271 = X 1.38 198 = X 2.37 42 .50 = 84
159 X 1.38 117 = X 2.37 42 .85 = 49
STEP 4: For the LTC and COL computations, select the least
of the upper bounds and the greatest of the lower
bounds.
-'-Utilization rates between .33 and .67 are within the
acceptable range; .50 is ideal. A utilization rate of .50
means half of one's assignments will be in one of his
specialties. The higher the rate, the fewer officers in the
inventory; the lower, vice versa. The selection rates of
.50-. 85 were used for FY83 to improve initial utilization
rates and to reflect the fact that 85 percent of all
colonels serve in TDA organizations and all colonel valida-




STEP f: Determine utilization rates for the upper and lower
bounds to confirm if the inventory will remain
within the utilization rate tolerance, .50-. 85
98 161 = .61 59 118 = .50 42 50 = .84
98 159 = .62 59 117 = .50 42 49 = .85
STEP 6: Calculate the number of captains to school fully-
funded to produce 159 to 161 majors holding FA53:
32. At this step and for following steps the FAR
model is not used. Instead, the analyst must
consider the continuation rate from captain to
major and the fact taht the target population for
schooling (those with 6-8 years commissioned
service) will have 3-5 years of service prior to
selection/promotion to major.
STEP 7: Adjust the fully- funded input based on the previous
year's production from all other sources^^ except
fully-funded. Consider only master's in
disciplines which support FA53.
Calculated Input: 3 2
Less previous year's Production
(other than fully funded)
_9
Adjusted Total 2 3
STEP 8: Adjust down for budget constraints, if applicable.
STEP 9: Select officers for master's level schooling.
^This includes the Degree Completion Program (DCP)
,
Army Degree Program for ROTC Instructor Duty (ADPRID) , and
Cooperative Degree Program (COOP)
.
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COMPUTER GENERATED FAR MODEL OUTPUT, FOR FY83
SPECIALTY AUTH TARSET INV TARGET URATE 1.0 SR
MAJ LTC COL MAJ LTC COL MAJ LTC COL CPT YG
« 11 33 9 2 32 23 10 1.03 .39 .20 6
• 12 10 10 12 8 4 .83 1.25 • 00 2
13 11 5 3 14 10 4 .79 .50 .75 3
m m u 2 4 3 1 1.00 .67 .00 1
• 15 9 7 1 10 7 3 .90 1.00 .33 2
• 21 115 172 156 493 362 152 .23 .48 1.03 104
25 16 19 7 31 23 10 .52 .83 .70 6
27 67 43 15 92 67 28 .73 .64 *54 18
26 37 17 12 46 34 14 .80 .50 .86 9
31 31 22 9 52 38 16 .60 .58 .56 10
* 35 33 6 6 34 25 11 .97 .32 .55 7
* 36 1 3 4 3 1 .25 1.00 .00 1
• 37 12 8 1 12 9 4 1.00 .89 .25 2
* *1 80 57 44 164 121 51 .49 .47 .86 30
• *2 7 13 7 23 17 7 .30 .76 l.OC 4
• 43 9 8' . 5 19 14 6 .47 .57 .83 5
« 4<4 19 27 13 47 34 14 .40 .79 .93 9
« *5 69 93 61 206 151 64 .33 .62 .95 39
*6 5<4 38 21 97 71 30 .56 .54 .70 20
ik (id 176 178 143 491 360 152 .36 .49 .94 87
* 49 212 128 27 2C8 168 70 .93 .76 .39 45
• 51 96 114 67 237 174 73 .41 .6<s .92 49
52 H2 33 11 6o 48 20 .65 .69 .5S 15
-53 98 59 42 161 118 50 .61 .50 .84 32
• 5i* 17 14 32 97 71 30 .18 .20 1.07 18
• 71 10 11 10 33 24 10 .30 .46 1.00 7
• 72 H 9 8 24 17 .17 .53 1.14 6
« 73 3 4 4 12 9 .25 .44 1.00 2
7«* 10 9 5 20 14 .50 .64 .83 4
* 75 3 3 4 12 9 .25 .33 l.OC 2
« 61 6 6 6 20 15 .30 .53 l.OC- 4
* 82 6 13 4 18 14 .33 .93 .67 4
* 91 8 19 12 38 28 12 .21 .68 l.OD 8
• 92 15 20 10 36 26 11 .42 .77 .91 7
• 95 9 16 14 43 32 13 .21 .50 1.08 8
• 97 34 37 53 164 121 51 .21 .31 1.04 31
TOTALS 1367 1236 815 3092 2268 956
DENOTES TARSET UTILIZATION OUT OF TOLERANCE {.S0.9S)
608
Source: MILPERCEN files, 1982
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APPENDIX J
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OFFICE
OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
STUDY GROUP. 1979
The preceeding analyses and observations led to the
following conclusions:
1. The current system of managing graduate education
in DOD is difficult to explain and defend before
Congress.
2. The average educational level of officers is
rising, due mainly to other than fully-funded
programs. Inputs from fully-funded programs have
declined and now account for about 25% of the
graduate-educated officers.
3. The average educational level of middle-rank and
senior officers is comparable to that of executives
in industry.
4. The benefits of education—other than in filling
validated billets—are not considered in the
current system.
5. Service initiatives may improve the process of
determining officer personnel requirements for
graduate education.
6. In the near term DOD does not have a feasible
alternative to the degree tomeasure requirements or
assets.
7. The current system has several management problems.
Requirements
- Requirements are not projected.
- Fully-funded students are sometimes assigned to
disciplines where the Services have surpluses.
- Students are sometimes not assigned to disciplines
where the Services have shortages.
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- Requirements are not resource-constrained and are
not explicitly prioritized.
Assets
- Assets are not fully utilized
With 63K advanced degree holders and
18K validated billets
— Only 55% of the validated billets are filled
Many officers with advanced degrees cannot be
used in validated billets.
Data
- Data reporting is inadequate. The Services
cannot identify usable assets
cannot manage non-funded degrees
- OSD does not have the resources to manage graduate
education in DOD.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above conclusions, the Department of
Defense should implement the following:
1. Improve the management of graduate education in DOD
a. Requirements:
- Direct the Services to prioritize
validated billets (50% Priority I, 30%
Priority II, 20% Priority III)
.
- Direct the Army, Air Force and Marine
Corps to establish differential manning
factors by grade and career field.
- Program a research effort to project
graduate education requests by Service
and disciplines through the year 2000.
- Evaluate the Service initiatives now
underway or planned.
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Establish a study group to evaluate
inconsistencies in validated billets
within and between Services.
b. Assets
Direct the Services to review the
inventory of advanced degree holders and
designate individuals as usuable and non-
usable, specifying the reason why non-
usable degrees cannot be used.
Maintain retrievable data on funding
source, by Service, by discipline (career
field) , specifying usable and non-usable
and submit annual reports to OSD.
Establish a DOD policy to fund graduate
education only where shortages exist.
Establish minimum utilization policy for
DOD-funded graduate education.
Manage graduate education to maintain DOD
comparability with industry.
Establish a DOD element such as a Defense Schools
Agency with adequate resources to manage graduate
education.
Source: [Ref. 37:pp. 28-31]
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